Speaker
Description
Previous research on whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NPR) works has focused on whether it deters states from seeking nuclear weapons, with mixed results. We investigate an alternative mechanism: by suppressing the global market for nuclear technology, the NPR forces would-be proliferants to build sensitive nuclear facilities on their own and in secret. This should affect both what kind of facilities a state tries to build and how long it takes to complete them, because each state must essentially re-invent the technology for itself. We analyze a newly completed dataset of nuclear facilities and compare it to data on conventional power plants, which are not subject to any nonproliferation regime. We find that the NPR has dramatically increased the time required to build nuclear facilities, relative to what would have occurred in its absence. In aggregate, the regime has prevented thousands of nuclear-state-years, arguably proving that it is enormously effective.
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | International Relations |
|---|---|
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | No, I am submitting a Closed Panel abstract |
| Are you a PhD student or early-career researcher? | No |
