Speaker
Description
What explains the variation in the Soviet Union’s/Russia’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation? While many scholars have examined the US role in the nonproliferation regime, relatively little scholarly research has systematically considered Moscow’s nonproliferation and nuclear assistance policy. By fusing insights from previous nonproliferation theories with literature about Moscow’s understanding of international relations, I develop a novel theoretical framework to explain the variation in Moscow’s commitment to curbing proliferation. It hypothesizes that Moscow’s varying nuclear assistance and safeguards policy toward different states—and thus the variation in its nonproliferation commitment—is best explained by policy-makers’ views and approaches toward differently aligned states: while officials in Moscow feared that adversaries and allies would develop nuclear weapons, they were less concerned about proliferation risks of non-aligned states. I test the theory’s propositions by using statistical analysis and an updated dataset on Soviet/Russian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1955 and 2020 as well as a new score of recipient states’ embeddedness in the nonproliferation regime. Against the backdrop of intensifying great power competition and an assertive Russia whose commitment to nonproliferation is not a foregone conclusion, this article enhances scholarly understanding of Moscow’s role in the nonproliferation regime and the nuclear order.
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | International relations, security studies |
|---|---|
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | No, I am submitting a Closed Panel abstract |
| Are you a PhD student or early-career researcher? | Yes |
