Conveners
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
- Clara PORTELA (University of Valencia)
Description
This panel serves as a platform to present and discuss new research on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In light of Russia‘s nuclear threats and Iran’s growing nuclear program, the panel especially encourages submissions that focus on strategies and institutions to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. The panel aims to bring into conversation scholars from different disciplines, such as political science, history, international law, and science and technology studies (STS), and seeks to facilitate a multidisciplinary dialog on non-proliferation and arms control. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the tension between nuclear disarmament and deterrence; the role of civil society in managing nuclear risks; and international verification. Preference will be given to submissions that have a clear European angle and address both past patterns and current challenges.
Arms control has increasingly been pronounced “dead.” Indeed, recent empirics are grim. In 2023, Russia unilaterally suspended participation in New START, the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement since the Cold War. While the future of arms control is uncertain, Russia, China, and the United States have expressed nominal interest in maintaining strategic stability. However,...
What explains the variation in the Soviet Union’s/Russia’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation? While many scholars have examined the US role in the nonproliferation regime, relatively little scholarly research has systematically considered Moscow’s nonproliferation and nuclear assistance policy. By fusing insights from previous nonproliferation theories with literature about Moscow’s...
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) represents a critical step toward global nuclear disarmament, yet its universal adoption faces significant challenges, particularly due to resistance from nuclear-armed states. This paper examines the potential for expanding the TPNW’s adoption by drawing insights from the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons...
Previous research on whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NPR) works has focused on whether it deters states from seeking nuclear weapons, with mixed results. We investigate an alternative mechanism: by suppressing the global market for nuclear technology, the NPR forces would-be proliferants to build sensitive nuclear facilities on their own and in secret. This should affect both what...
