EISS 2025 - Annual ConferenceAnnual Conference

26 Jun 2025, 08:00 → 27 Jun 2025, 19:20 Europe/Athens

Conference Room "Ilias Koukouvelis" (University of Macedonia)

Hugo Meijer (Sciences Po CERI), Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University), Silvia D'Amato (Leiden University)

Welcome to the EISS Annual Conference! This is our largest event, bringing together hundreds of academics, graduate students, and policy-makers.

This year, we are bringing EISS to Thessaloniki, with the kind support of the University of Macedonia.

The Annual Conference is structured around two categories of panels. Closed panels are recurring year-over-year and are pre-established by the EISS. Open panels are proposed by participants. They are intended to broaden the range of existing themes in the EISS and to provide the community with the chance to uniquely shape the programme and content of the Conference.

Call for Abstracts (Permalink)

Final Programme (Permalink)

Thursday 26 June

09:00 → 09:30 Registration and Coffee

09:30 → 10:00 Introductory Remarks

Conveners: Prof. Alexandros Chatzgeorgiou (University of Macedonia), Dr Hugo Meijer (Sciences Po CERI), Revecca Pedi (University of Macedonia)

10:00 → 11:25 Cybersecurity and digital technologies in international security, strategy, and global power relations

Convener: Julia Carver (University of Oxford)

10:00 Regulatory Asymmetries in Cryptocurrency Governance: Implications for Sanctions Evasion

The rise of cryptocurrencies has introduced new dynamics in the global financial and geopolitical landscape, shaping both economic opportunities and security challenges. Among these challenges, cryptocurrencies have become strategic instruments for circumventing sanctions, exploiting their decentralized nature and regulatory fragmentation. The absence of a cohesive, multilateral regulatory framework has led to significant asymmetries between sanctioning and sanctioned states, creating vulnerabilities that can be leveraged for geopolitical advantage. This paper investigates how regulatory environments in sanctioned states influence the use of cryptocurrencies for sanctions evasion, employing a comparative case study of two sanctioned and two sanctioning jurisdictions. It develops a framework that examines key variables such as the strictness of regulatory requirements, cryptocurrency adoption levels, documented cases of sanctions evasion, regulatory countermeasures, and the overall effectiveness of enforcement. Preliminary findings indicate that sanctioned states strategically exploit regulatory gaps to sustain financial connectivity while sanctioning states struggle with the extraterritorial enforcement of crypto-related sanctions. This research contributes to broader debates on digital sovereignty, global governance, and cyber-enabled financial strategies, highlighting the need for enhanced multilateral coordination in regulating cryptocurrencies. Within the broader context of international security, this study underscores the role of regulation as a tool for power, shaping state capabilities and influence in the evolving digital economy. By highlighting these dynamics, the research seeks to inform policymakers, scholars, and practitioners about the complexities of cryptocurrency regulation and its impact on the effectiveness of international sanctions.

Speaker: Orfeas Anastasios Koidis (Rijkuniversiteit Groningen)

Abstract-Regulatory Asymmetries in Cryptocurrency Governance-Implications for Sanctions Evasion.docx

Preliminary Draft_Koidis.pdf

10:20 Competitive Cyber Statecraft of the Middle-Ground: A Neoclassical Realist Model

As cyberspace becomes a central arena for geopolitical competition, middle-ground countries — those neither strictly aligned with Western nor Eastern spheres of influence — play a growing role in shaping cyber governance (Gartzke and Lindsay, 2015; Nye, 2022). Traditional neorealist frameworks, which emphasize balancing and bandwagoning, fail to explain the diversity of cyber sovereignty approaches among these states. This paper applies neoclassical realism (NCR) to analyze how elite perceptions, economic dependencies, and security considerations mediate systemic pressures, leading to varied models of cyber statecraft (Rose, 1998; Kitchen and Tirosh, 2021).

The study identifies four distinct cyber sovereignty approaches: strategic alignment, where middle-ground and other smaller states integrate into dominant digital ecosystems for economic benefits (e.g., Ireland, Luxembourg); sovereignty assertion, where states impose digital restrictions based on nationalist or security concerns (e.g., India, Indonesia); selective engagement, where states participate in norm-setting while hedging between major blocs (e.g., ASEAN, South Africa); and pragmatism, where states adopt fluid digital partnerships to maximize flexibility (e.g., Brazil, UAE) (Mueller, 2017; Segal, 2018).

By examining the domestic political drivers behind these choices, this paper challenges the liberal assumption that states will internalize global cyber norms through multilateral institutions (Drezner, 2004; DeNardis, 2020). Instead, it argues that economic fragmentation and regional coalitions are shaping the future of cyber governance, with middle-ground states acting as key decision-makers rather than passive rule-takers (Gopinath et al., 2025), contributing to de-centering international relations (IR) (Zambrano Márquez, 2020).

The policy implications suggest that major powers and international organizations must engage middle-ground countries as strategic cyber actors rather than treating them as peripheral players. Supporting regional digital coalitions and offering flexible, case-sensitive partnerships will be critical to ensuring a stable, multipolar cyber order. As cyberspace governance fragments, understanding the agency of middle-ground states is essential to shaping the future of international cyber politics.

Speaker: Dr Arthur Laudrain (King's College London - Department of War Studies)

10:40 Infrastructural frontlines of (dis)information: data territoriality in the Russian war against Ukraine

The Russia-Ukraine war has critically underscored the importance of cyberspace in modern conflicts, with cyberattacks, information operations, and infrastructure attacks playing a key role since 2014. Beyond the battlefield, both Ukraine and Russia have pursued ambitious digital sovereignty policies that seek to protect their respective “information spaces.” Rooted in the strategic imperative of controlling information flows to secure their territory, these policies are designed to shape and transform the underlying network architectures of the Internet following strongly territorialized conceptions of data and information sovereignty. Since 2022, these policies have intensified, actively reshaping the geographies of data and information, particularly in and around the occupied territories of Ukraine.

This paper investigates how multiple actors are increasingly using digital infrastructures to create and maintain new forms of information control, leading to the emergence of complex data geographies. By employing a mixed-methods approach—including OSINT techniques to track internet data, infrastructure mapping, and fieldwork interviews with key stakeholders—this research highlights how an entanglement of opposite policies contributes to the borderization of data, thus shaping the conditions under which parts of the Internet can or cannot be accessed in occupied territories. By mapping the fragmentation of the digital space alongside contemporary and moving frontlines, this paper underscores how Ukraine’s efforts to maintain connectivity in occupied territories and Russia’s attempts to integrate these areas into its digital governance frameworks impacts the cognitive environment of the population, illustrating the strategic importance of data territorialization in contemporary warfare.

Bridging perspectives from political geography, geopolitics, and Science and Technology Studies (STS), this paper argues that the war in Ukraine illustrates a broader trend in which political actors increasingly reshape the fundamental architecture of cyberspace, including its logical infrastructure. It contributes to discussions on geographies of the digital, digital sovereignty, and the role of infrastructures in modern strategic competition.

Speaker: Louis PETINIAUD (GEODE - French Institute of Geopolitics, Paris 8 University)

11:00 Online military influencers in a social media age

The invention of social media is one of the most significant technological developments of the last decades. It has transformed the way our society works by facilitating methods of communication that allow broader participation in public debate. This has given rise to the phenomenon of online influencers who establish themselves as authoritative voices within a specific field outside of existing media structures or traditional societal institutions.
This development is also visible in the media ecology covering military operations, and it forces military organizations to change their approach to public relations. Indeed, to some extent, military organizations must embrace social media themselves and mimic the behavior of social media influencers to get their message across in a fierce competition for public attention.
The paper explores the phenomenon of ‘military influencers’ through a mapping of the different types of social media accounts that that have gained influence during the war in Ukraine. The starting point is an analysis of the references from the daily reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which has become one of the most quoted sources in mainstream reporting on the Russo-Ukrainian war. Being referenced by ISW is, therefore, a good indicator that a particular online voice has an impact on public discourse. ISW has referenced many thousands of sources, most of which come from different social media platforms. Digital methods are leveraged in the study to categorize these sources based on military affiliation, level of independence, nationality, social media platform, etc.
The paper gives a unique overview of the different types of military influencers using data from an ongoing war. In doing so, the study adds to our understanding of the impact of social media on military organizations and provides insights of value to practitioners engaged in military cyber and media operations.

Speaker: Anders Puck Nielsen (Royal Danish Defence College)

11:30 → 13:00 Military Technology

This panel focuses on the interplay between military technology and global security – and how scholars study it. Emerging technologies are unquestionably shaping the ways in which policy makers, military, and industry do security and defence. New developments in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, hypersonics, quantum computing, and space technology are projected to have transformative – even disruptive – effects on strategic stability, military innovation, defence economics, and the conduct of warfare. Most new military technology is dual use and has commercial origins, widening the spectrum of threats and actors with access to technology thanks to cheaper alternatives to military-grade systems. This trend affects the relations among commercial interests (private companies), scientific thought leaders (epistemic communities), those who weaponize technology (militaries), and those who develop technology policy (political leaders). Research on designing key principles for global technology governance and standards for military applications of emerging technologies is in high demand, while the dynamics between old and new technologies on the battlefields is still poorly understood. At the same time, how we study military technology requires more methodological rigor. Responsible forecasting is yet to moderate exaggerated expectations about military technology’s capabilities, inclinations to technological determinism, and strategic overkills. This panel invites submissions that theoretically and conceptually advance our understanding of how military technology changes the security environment. It encourages diversity in scientific disciplines (political science, sociology, economy, history, philosophy), theories, and methods, since the panel primarily aims to facilitate dialogue between scholars interested in how politics and technology interact.

Convener: Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

11:30 Does Preeminence in Emerging and Military Technologies Matter for International Status and Prestige? Experimental Study

International relations literature on status and prestige demonstrates that states tend to seek technological capabilities and premier weapon systems to shape and improve their international status and prestige. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether such efforts are worthwhile and serve the purpose of enhancing status and prestige. I attempt to address this question through a conjoint survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of 1,000 American nationals. I use artificial intelligence, uncrewed and autonomous systems, and aircraft carriers as attributes for emerging and military technologies, alongside other factors that are shown to be relevant to a state's status and prestige. Through a conjoint design, I aim to explore whether the level of advancement in AI and possession of such technologies improve status and prestige in international politics. Besides, I also intend to test several other hypotheses regarding the source of technology possession and also, based on attitudinal factors such as familiarity with AI, confidence in defense and military AI, and techno-skepticism. Moreover, my design differentiates status and prestige as distinct concepts, which allows a more nuanced understanding of each phenomenon and its interaction with technology. Findings will contribute to a better understanding of the role played by emerging and military technologies in status- and prestige-seeking efforts, informing the respective literature in IR and security studies.

Speaker: Zakir Rzazade (Charles University)

11:50 What’s Got You So Worried? The Replicator Initiative and US Techno-Anxieties in an Age of Great Power Competition

Focusing on the case of the Replicator Initiative, first announced in September 2023, this paper (re)examines the drivers behind the Pentagon’s push to accelerate the development and deployment of AI systems in support of its focus on great power competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite experimenting with AI associated technologies since the 1950s, it has only been since the institutionalization of great power competition as the focus of American defense planning during the first Trump administration that “attributable” autonomous systems have been prioritized in the Pentagon’s military innovation efforts. This paper generates new insights into this apparent puzzle by drawing from the International Relations (IR) literatures on military innovation, emotions, and ontological security. This provides a framework for developing the study of techno-anxiety as a constitutive feature of American foreign and security policy - one that is mirrored by, but analytically distinct from, the techno-opportunism highlighted in many existing accounts. Through this intervention, this study traces how American military anxieties about AI extend beyond fears of "killer robots" to encompass a broader set of geopolitical and affective concerns about the future—specifically, apprehensions about the unknowable effects of technological development on the combat effectiveness of the American military, the durability of the rules-based international order, and existing understandings of American national identity. These findings suggest that the Replicator Initiative is not merely intended to deter a potential PRC military attack on Taiwan by 2027. It is also rooted in a deep unease about what the rapid pace of technological change could mean for America’s place in the world and perception of self.

Speaker: Tom Watts (Royal Holloway, University of London (Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow))

12:20 The Erosion of Traditional Deterrence: Space as a Case Study in Military Transformation

This paper will examine the evolving interplay between legacy military technologies and emerging innovations, arguing that the transformation of the battlefield has reached a critical tipping point at which traditional doctrines are no longer adequate, and will do so by using space as a case study. As Cold War-era systems—constructed on static deterrence models—confront cutting-edge dual-use innovations such as autonomous satellite constellations, and cyber-enabled space operations, the security environment in space is undergoing a profound reconfiguration. Drawing on empirical analyses of state practises and legal frameworks from authoritative sources including the Woomera Manual, the MILAMOS Project, and the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Operations, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of how these new technologies disrupt conventional military effectiveness and strategic stability.

The paper will first delineate the characteristics of legacy versus modern technologies, highlighting how historical systems have shaped deterrence through predictable and well-understood doctrines. In contrast, recent innovations introduce heightened unpredictability, diffuse the locus of control, and expand the pool of actors—encompassing non-state and commercial entities—thereby complicating attribution and response strategies. This analysis will expose critical vulnerabilities in current international legal regimes, which were originally devised for a markedly different technological era. The paper will propose a multi-pronged framework to bridge the gap between traditional and modern military capabilities, focusing on revising operational doctrines to incorporate real-time data analytics and adaptive response measures; and developing updated legal interpretations that reconcile existing treaty obligations with the realities of dual-use technologies.

Speaker: Raoul Cardellini Leipertz (LUMSA University)

Cardellini Leipertz - Abstract INDICO.pdf

11:30 → 13:00 War and Strategy

War has returned to Europe. However, European strategic thinking and understanding of war remain underdeveloped, stemming from a long-standing reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the widespread belief that war was a relic of the past. As European actors grapple with this new reality, now is an opportune moment to critically examine existing knowledge on war and strategy, assess its relevance to contemporary contexts, and encourage innovative perspectives. This panel seeks to serve as a platform for advancing a European debate on the use of force for political purposes. It invites papers addressing war and strategy in a broad and inclusive sense, drawing from a variety of disciplines—such as history, political science, and sociology—and engaging with diverse approaches—from fundamental ontological and theoretical questions (such as, what is war and how do we know?) to empirical analyses examining the specifics of military capabilities and their implications for strategy. Submissions may focus on both historical and contemporary topics and explore various factors shaping strategy, including technological, cultural, social, and environmental influences, moral and ethical considerations, and the role of ideas, discourses, and imaginaries of (future) war in shaping today’s thinking. The panel also encourages innovative engagements with key concepts in strategic studies—such as deterrence, escalation, and violence—and contributions that critically but constructively evaluate the current state of the field or the dynamics and outcomes of knowledge production on war.

Convener: Chiara Libiseller (Leiden University)

11:30 Reanimating Grand Strategy in Volatile Times

Europe – and much of the traditional liberal democratic world – has not had to think much about war for the last 30 years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed this, while Sino-American competition and an America-first agenda only intensifies it. Where war was part of the collective policy framework or cultural imaginary it was wars of choice, not wars of necessity. International security, not national (or European) defence. The last 30 years was an intermission – a punctation mark of relative peace against a backdrop of the persistent and recurring war.
This paper steps back to ask what implications this has for a particular form of European body politic: imaginative policy planning, training and grand strategic thinking. This tradition lived on in War Colleges but less so in academia or within government. European policy debates anchored on butter, not guns, and even now the immediate crisis is one of war and peace (in Ukraine), deterrence (of Russia), defence planning (for NATO and the EU) and fiscal realism (to fund rising defence budgets). Short-term crisis response overwhelms long-term imagination.
Europe may have the Munich Security Conference and the EU Institute for Security Studies, but ‘strategic studies’ has a thin presence – including in the United Kingdom. What existing institutional framework exists for Grand Strategy, Policy Planning and ‘big picture’ strategic thinking about war, deterrence and hybrid conflict? To what extent is Europe equipped with the same intellectual inputs as exist from the U.S. Naval War College or statecraft programmes at the University of Texas? Where are the shared intellectual fora that bring together practitioners and thinkers in Europe? Where are the platforms for longer-term ideas to be set out, discussed and debated? This paper will assess current capability and explore options for renewal – including through new institutionalisation and networking.

Speaker: Prof. Alexander Evans (London School of Economics)

11:50 The Strategy of Subversion: National Security between Warfare and Diplomacy

As world politics has shifted towards strategic competition, states increasingly navigate an international terrain marked by intensified, protracted political conflict. Here, subversion appears as a central, but not fully understood form of statecraft. Great powers find themselves interlocked in a subversive-countersubversive dynamic characterized by the employment of a mixture of military and non-military means with an intensity above the level of peaceful relations, but below the level of war. This dynamic highlights the role and character of subversion relatively to diplomacy and warfare. Accordingly, this paper examines subversion as a critical and distinctive form of statecraft. First, we situate subversion in relation to concepts that tend to shape, but also constrain, thinking on the link between subversion, diplomacy and warfare: coercive diplomacy, irregular, hybrid and political warfare, and gray zone conflict. Second, we argue that subversion is best understood in juxtaposition to warfare (as the statecraft of war) and diplomacy (as the statecraft of peace). Mirroring these more overt and well-defined forms of statecraft, subversion has distinct purposes, it has its own measures and tools, it is organized in a particular way and involves certain actors, and it is based on a unique set of justifications. Third, using illustrative examples from the conflict between the West and Russia and China, we analyze how the use of subversive and countersubversive strategies have significant consequences for the practice and logic of warfare and diplomacy. In a sense, subversion subverts other essential forms of statecraft. Fourth, we highlight the core challenges that subversion presents for the United States and Europe, respectively, especially as it pertains to the changing character and organization of defence and warfare. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of our theoretical exploration for emerging research on subversion, on conflictual statecraft, and on strategy in Western states.

Speakers: Henrik Breitenbauch (Royal Danish Defence College), Niels Byrjalsen (University of Copenhagen)

12:30 Assisting to Win? Military Assistance and Coercion in War

Coercion is a central strategy for states in an increasingly competitive and hostile international environment, and there are several military means or tools they can use to coerce an opponent into submission, such as, air power, invasions and land grabs, or even nuclear threats. Military assistance, i.e. the training, equipping and advising of foreign state and non-state armed forces to enhance their capability to fight wars, is usually not understood as one of these tools. Instead, research on military assistance tends to focus on the utility of military assistance for the receiving actor, for example, if it contributes to peace, or if it increases the strength of armed forces in the receiving state. Despite the quite extensive use of military assistance in contemporary international relations, we know precariously little about the strategic utility of military assistance for the sponsor state. Do the strengthening of friendly foreign state and non-state armed forces contribute to the coercive power of the sponsor state? Is it a waste of resources? Or could it in fact, contribute to a higher level of threats against the sponsor state?

By understanding military assistance as a tool in the strategic toolbox, we can begin to tease out the strategic logic and scrutinize the utility of military assistance for increasing the coercive power as well as security of the sponsor state. In this paper, I will develop the logic of military assistance as a coercive tool and use a plausibility probe to study these dynamics through empirical case studies. In addition to the conceptual elaborations, the paper will demonstrate the general logic of military assistance as a coercive tool as well as the particular mechanisms of its individual subtypes in a number of short empirical case studies.

Speaker: Kersti Larsdotter (Swedish Defense University)

13:00 → 14:00 Lunch

14:00 → 15:25 Roundtable 1: Nuclear Coercion

Conveners: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard (Norwegian Intelligence School), Lauren Sukin (London School of Economics and Political Science), Lydia Wachs (Stockholm University), Prof. Michal Onderco (Erasmus University Rotterdam), Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

15:30 → 17:00 Military Interventions

With the winding down of large-scale boots-on-the-ground multinational missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has become apparent in both policy and academic circles that large-scale military interventions are but one option among others. Many other kinds of military interventions have been and are being launched and implemented, ranging from military assistance, to more ‘agile’ counterinsurgency, drone fighting, peacekeeping, and aerial interventions, among others. Recent work has investigated the politics of forming multinational coalitions for launching military interventions. Other contributions have explored the politics of implementation, looking at caveats and actual behavior of troops on the ground. A third strand has explored the implication of military interventions for the civil-military relations of the home country when those soldiers return home. Notwithstanding recent advances, within the field of security studies, there is little clarity about the conceptual, theoretical and empirical underpinnings of different kinds of military interventions with important implications for both scholarship and policy. This panel welcomes contributions on different types of military interventions and potential comparisons. Contributions are welcome from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and may shed light on conceptual, theoretical and empirical aspects of the ongoing debate on military interventions within the security studies debate in dialogue with other neighboring fields such as peace and conflict research, war studies and military sociology.

Convener: Peter Viggo Jakobsen (Royal Danish Defence College)

15:30 The “Transparent Battlefield” and its Implications for Western Movement and Maneuver Warfighting

Ever since the Gulf War, the Western way of war has been firmly anchored in network-centric combined arms operations and executing them with a Clausewitzian concentration of forces to disarm the enemy. For this dislocating attack to effect psychological shock and operational and tactical surprise, speed and agility in movement are essential. The undiminished belief in unrivaled AirLand supremacy in Western defense establishment circles notwithstanding, the Ukraine War suggests significant impediments to maneuver warfare, with Luttwak going as far as declaring it impossible. The key obstacle to breaking through is what has come to be called the “transparency of the battlefield.” Because the enemy can see, track, and lock on to a (moving) ground target in real-time, amassing a large enough force to overwhelm him––which takes time, space, and organization that can be detected––has proven challenging. With geospatial data from satellites, advanced radar systems, and precision surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles, a stalemate has ensued where a lot of the friction and attrition of one’s own fighting capacity occurs without even beginning to approach the frontline. One can think of first-person view loitering munitions and long-range precision fire in shoot-and-scoot counter-battery duels. This article answers three questions. First, how have technological innovations making the battlefield “transparent” impacted Western movement and maneuver warfighting? Second, has the defensive regained dominance in the tactical offense/defense balance? Third, if this is the case, what implications does this have for the European force structure (and procurement) and warfighting doctrine – should Europe move to attrition warfare premised on the strategic defensive?

Speaker: Dr Friso Stevens (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies)

15:50 Helping your friends in need? Military Interventions and the Reliability of Defense Cooperation Agreements

Whether a state intervenes militarily in international crises and civil wars depends on the type of relations the two states maintain. Formal alliance and defense cooperation agreements are a costly signal of assistance but not in every case can a country count on its friends. The reliability of cooperation agreements is especially important for smaller states that are dependent on support from a powerful ally. However, many alliances are not honored. Military interventions by former colonial powers need to be reassessed in light of alliance reliability and post-colonial political and economic ties. Contradictory expectations emerge if the protective power maintain close ties to both belligerents, which is especially the case for major powers that pursue broader spheres of interest.
This paper will systematically investigate the patterns of French military interventions in Africa and ask why it intervened in some former colonies but not in others. In the past, France often responded to requests for military support when asked by a protégé, while at other times, it remained inactive despite an existing defense cooperation agreement. There is variation of French interventions across countries but also for individual countries over time, such as in Chad where France intervened frequently but not in all critical situations. Relying on data from the Thorette report on French military operations abroad and the International Military Intervention dataset, we will assess the relative importance of defense cooperation agreements. Accounting for various opportunities that arise in the potential target state, such as military coups, rebellions, and international militarized disputes, we will investigate under what conditions the French government decided to send military support. A better understanding of whether France has been a reliable alliance partner or intervened selectively depending on its own geostrategic and economic interests will help explaining why it lost ground in Africa.

Speaker: Margit Bussmann

16:10 The Resistance Operating Concept’s Deterrent to Impress: Distinct Causal Theories of Success.

The Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) brings Second World War and Cold War stay-behind resistance operations back into consideration for strategic and operational planners. The ROC describes national stay-behind civilian resistance organization during partial or total occupation by a belligerent actor. Current events in Eastern Europe have triggered military interest in preparing for such stay-behind armed resistance. However, the conceptual underpinning for this renewed embracement of resistance operations lacks in both depth and width. First, the ROC assumes a linear progression from planning and preparation through the execution of resistance activities over the course of a belligerent military invasion. Such a singular linear course of action falsely implies a one-sided pathway to success. This does not take the geographical space nor the severity of suppression of the population in the occupied territories, i.e. the occupation environment, into account. Moreover, such an approach conveys an impression that stay-behind resistance activities could achieve success in isolation of other elements of national resistance (through means other than guerrilla-like stay-behind units). Hence, this paper delves into distinct phases defined as: preparation for resistance, resistance to invasion, resistance to occupation, and support to liberation, each with a specific (potential) contribution to successful resistance. It does so by employing the concept of causal theory of threat to possible occupation environments and then by applying the concept of causal theory of success to stay-behind resistance’s phases. Military planners could achieve a more precise understanding of stay-behind operations vis-à-vis conventional military operations through such an approach. Such an understanding of resistance’s causal pathway to success could also aid in garnering the necessary popular, and military, support that stay-behind resistance organizations require in order to present a credible deterrent force during its preparation phase and a reliable force able to resist the potential belligerent when push comes to shove.

Speaker: Mr Martijn Rouvroije (Netherlands Defence Academy - Faculty of Military Sciences)

Proposal Abstract Resistance Causal Theories of Success.docx

16:30 Negotiation of front ends and back ends in NATO military advisory missions

In this paper, we explore the development of Western military missions, examining the shift from ‘winding down large-scale boots-on-the-ground multinational missions’ to a lighter military footprint, characterised by more distant security force assistance (SFA). Specifically, we focus on advisory and capacity-building activities in Iraq, concentrating on the day-to-day work conducted in NATO Mission Iraq (NMI). Drawing on a field study that includes interviews with mission participants, documents, and observational data, we investigate the activities of NATO personnel in NMI, illustrating how a diverse range of individuals collaborate on complex tasks within a limited timeframe, presenting various organisational and strategic challenges. Using Anselm Strauss’s negotiated order perspective, we analyse how the mission's nature entails ongoing negotiations centred around mission objectives and end state (including purpose complexity and host nation development), mission progress and success measurement (including assessing ‘what’ and determining for ‘whom’), as well as broader professional role competencies (such as military skills, subject-matter expertise, and English language proficiency). This paper contributes to current literature on military missions and civil-military relations by addressing the structural and contextual conditions that influence negotiations among participants in the NATO workforce. It represents an endeavour to comprehend the challenges faced by successful military advisory missions, considering NATO’s unique character and the limits of military expertise.

Speakers: Dr Anders Klitmøller (The Royal Danish Defence College), Dr Anne Obling (The Royal Danish Defence College)

15:30 → 17:00 Private Actors, Armed Conflict and the State

Private and extra-legal actors are at the center of politics today. A proliferation of these actors — including mercenaries, private security companies, cartels, gangs, local militias, and rebels, among others — has been identified as the central source of the state’s loss of monopoly over the use of violence and influence over its territories and communities. Throughout the world, these actors have been fulfilling political functions through the use and threat of violence and by cultivating complex and overlapping relationships with each other, local communities, and the state. The behaviors of these actors and interactions between them, local communities, and the state have significant political and social consequences that we are only beginning to understand. The panel aims to explore these complex links and interactions at the local, national and transnational levels. It aims to bring scholars seeking to understand the history, dynamics, and policy implications of this increasingly complicated landscape. It intends to address the following questions: How and why do extra-legal actors use violence, and what are the consequences of this violence? How and why do these same actors seek to provide goods and services to communities and create social and political orders? How have states responded to these actors, and why have they sometimes chosen to collaborate with and support them and others to combat them fiercely? How have citizens and local communities responded to these actors? What moral and legal challenges do these interactions imply? The panel welcomes diverse theoretical and methodological approaches to the connections between private and public spheres in international security.

Convener: Dr Zarras Konstantinos (University of Macedonia)

15:30 Big tech at war: The infrastructural politics of public-private relations

This article examines the role of big tech companies in international politics through an infrastructural lens, focusing on their involvement in the Ukraine-Russia war. We situate the article in IR literature examining the public and the private not as a distinction but as public-private relations, and we draw inspiration from the infrastructural turn in social science to develop an approach that can capture the complex dynamics of state-big tech relations specifically and public-private relations broadly. The infrastructural perspective offers a way to understand how big tech companies shape international politics, moving beyond debates about state decline or corporate dominance on the one hand, and infrastructure as an external driver of change that allows for a neat separation of states and big tech and politics and technology on the other. Our analysis demonstrates three ways in which the infrastructural politics of big tech-state relations is expressed in the war in Ukraine, showing how sovereignty, geopolitical decision-making, and national security knowledge are contingent upon infrastructural arrangements entangling big tech companies and states. The analysis points to how infrastructural politics is at the core of expressing and realizing what makes both states and big tech companies, offering new avenues for understanding and examining public-private relations in international politics.

Speaker: Tobias Liebetrau (University of Copenhagen)

15:50 We Are Peers Now: States’ Relations with Violent Non-State Actors That Became State/Sub-State Actors

The relationship between states and violent non-state actors (VNSAs) has been widely explored in International Relations and Security Studies over the past two and a half decades. Scholars have examined state-VNSA dynamics through frameworks of sponsorship, alliances, delegation, and proxy warfare, as well as through conflict and rivalry. However, a growing yet underexplored phenomenon is the transformation of some VNSAs into state or sub-state actors after gaining territorial control and governance capabilities. Cases such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, and various rebel groups in Syria illustrate how VNSAs can transition into sovereign entities, thereby reshaping their international roles. This article investigates how such transformations affect their relationships with states. Do states that previously supported a VNSA continue their backing once it assumes statehood? Do adversarial states reconsider their stance toward the newly established state actor? Based on a within-case analysis of the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 2021 takeover and the existing literature on state-VNSA dynamics, this study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the evolving interactions between states and VNSAs that turned into state or sub-state actors. Furthermore, it identifies the mechanisms that drive change or continuity in these relationships.

Speaker: Ido Gadi Raz (PhD fast track student of International Relations)

16:10 Private military companies as proxy forces in international politics with special reference to the Russian Wagner Group/African Corps and its operations in Africa

Since the Cold War’s end, private military companies (PMCs) have increasingly served as third parties in proxy wars, with states and non-state actors relying on them for military operations. These actors have become a key feature of external involvement in contemporary conflicts. Notable PMCs include Blackwater in Iraq, Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone, and the Russian Wagner Group.
Max Weber defined the modern state as a community that claims a monopoly on legitimate force. The rise of PMCs challenges this, undermining state sovereignty when governments outsource security and warfare—fundamental aspects of statehood. This shift reflects broader international trends where PMCs play an increasing role in global conflict dynamics, deviating from the traditional notion that states ensure security. Scholars argue that national sovereignty, as established after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), is in decline. Weaker states, with limited institutional capacity, struggle to control violence, making PMCs both a symptom and a cause of fragile governance.
The Wagner Group, closely tied to Russia, has influenced numerous African countries since 2014, advancing Russian interests while providing plausible deniability for the Kremlin. This avoids public fallout from military losses or human rights abuses abroad. The death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, following his rebellion against Putin, raised critical questions about Wagner’s future. As a key Russian foreign policy tool, Wagner played major roles in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, and Africa.
Now rebranded as the Africa Corps, Wagner remains active in Africa. This article examines its influence in Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali, exploring what the future holds for this PMC as it adapts to shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Speaker: Theo Neethling (University of the Free State)

16:30 From Revolt to Rule: Insurgency as Proto-State Formation

State formation is a continuous process, marked by the centralisation and monopolisation of power to establish authority over a population within a defined territory. This paper argues that insurgency is a centrifugal force challenging this centralisation. However, insurgents are not merely destructive but, driven by an idea of an alternative political order, are establishing a new form of formal or informal governance, though at the expense of the established state’s authority and monopolies on using force, collecting taxes, and enacting laws. In its nature, an insurgency is a complex and dynamic phenomenon, itself analogous to state formation, similar in its evolution through the establishment of political authority by monopolising the use of force and generating revenue. Thus, the state and insurgents compete on three key axes of monopolisation: on legislation, on the use of force, and on taxation, each forming a critical pillar of governance and authority. These features distinguish the inherent use of force in insurgency from violence associated with mutiny, rebellion, criminals and terrorist organisations.

This paper addresses theoretical gaps between insurgency and state formation by using the latter as a framework to analyse the former. Using complexity theory, it presents a model illustrating how distinct non-state groups and social structures may evolve from coexistence through cooperation to convergence into a proto-state, influenced by specific internal and external contextual factors that may contribute to insurgent success or failure. It posits that successful insurgencies often are a symbiosis of non-state groups or social structures possessing political-administrative, financial-economic, and force-exerting capabilities, enabling the formation of a proto-state. An insurgency’s nature lies in this process of integration, while its character is shaped by contextual factors. Additionally, the paper argues that securing and re-allocating revenue is a critical aspect in establishing insurgent governance and legitimacy, but often neglected the traditional political-military focus.

Speaker: Marnix Provoost

17:00 → 17:30 Poster Session / Coffee Break

● “Following the Algorithmic Path to Extremism: How Social Network Analysis Can Help to Target Extremist Content Online”
Clara Jammot, King's College London - Department of War Studies
● “Early-Stage Innovation and the Self-Enforcement of National Security Policy: The Case of Foreign Direct Investment Screening”
Nicholas Bahrich, ETH Zurich
● “Following the Algorithmic Path to Extremism: How Social Network Analysis Can Help to Target Extremist Content Online”
Clara Jammot, King's College London - Department of War Studies
● “Early-Stage Innovation and the Self-Enforcement of National Security Policy: The Case of Foreign Direct Investment Screening”
Nicholas Bahrich, ETH Zurich
● "Digital influence as a continuum: how Russia shapes Georgia’s information environment",
Appoline Roy, GEODE

17:30 → 18:30 Keynote

Convener: Prof. Loukos TSOUKALIS (Sciences Po Paris - University of Athens)

Friday 27 June

10:00 → 11:25 Defence Cooperation and Military Assistance: Studies in (Re)Alignments

For nearly all states, various forms of defence cooperation and military assistance are central to their national security policies. This can take the form of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, or of more structured and institutional cooperation through organisations such as the African Union, the EU, NATO, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of various forms of defence cooperation or military assistance, often on a regional or sub-regional level. It can also take a variety of forms, from joint military training and exercises to operational planning, procurement, and defence-industrial research. This panel invites papers on defence cooperation and military assistance in a broad and inclusive sense, from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and of analytical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. Papers may cover: responses to traditional security threats (Russia’s military assertiveness or China’s rise, etc.), or more diffuse risks and challenges (terrorism, proliferation, human smuggling and the impact of global climate change). Papers may also cover the creation and evolution of defence institutions, cooperation arrangements whether in bi-, tri-, or ‘minilateral’ ways and, last but not least, the organisational and operational aspects of innovation within the context of defence cooperation.

Convener: Revecca Pedi (University of Macedonia)

10:00 The Delegation of Defense and Security Responsibilities at Sea in Historical Perspective

The maritime warfare and security environment of the 21st century is changing. The proliferation of non-traditional maritime security threats, such as piracy, maritime terrorism, and illegal fishing, combined with the emergence of gray-zone warfare at sea through irregular actors, attests to this change. As a result, the international norms surrounding the use of force at sea are evolving as well, as states are increasingly delegating defense and security capabilities, traditionally considered exclusively state or military terrain, to non-state, nonmilitary, and irregular actors. Current scholarship generally analyzes these examples in isolation and fails to consider the broader framework of the changing maritime warfare and security environment to identify the dynamics underpinning this development. Moreover, while current scholarship commonly assumes that these are novel phenomena, the historical record includes a long-standing tradition of non-state and irregular maritime warfare and security actors, including the privateers and mercantile companies of the early-modern period. As a result, these contemporary examples could be considered symptoms of a more significant 21st-century development, representing the historical dynamism surrounding the international norms of maritime warfare and security. My PhD research project aims to analyze this development by combining traditional historical methods based on written primary source material with international relations theory and expert interviews. As an example of applied history, the project aims to operationalize historical precedents to better inform current policymakers and military leadership about the maritime security challenges of the future.

Speaker: Pieter Zhao (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Pieter Zhao - Conference Paper (EISS 2025).pdf

Pieter Zhao - EISS 2025 Panel Presentation.pptx

10:20 Do Principles Become Agents? Security Assistance between cooptation and orchestration

Under which circumstances is security assistance effective? This article aims to build a theoretical framework to help scholars and practitioners evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance (SA). Security Assistance consists in outsourcing the conduct of stability operations to local partners, increasing their military capacity and professionalism. While existing literature has highlighted SA's diverse and adaptive nature, it lacks an empirically grounded definition of success. By integrating the governor’s dilemma theory with SA literature, this article introduces the concepts of agent control and competence as benchmarks for successful SA. Thus, instead of measuring the extent to which providers achieve their foreign policy goals, this framework assesses SA effectiveness based on the role recipients play as policy intermediaries. This approach facilitates case-specific observations, also allowing for broader generalizations across cases. It constitutes an attempt to provide the practice of SA with a coherent set of concepts concerning the aim, the scope, and the limitations inherent to the relationship between providers and recipients. Therefore, first, the article reviews existing SA and policy evaluation literature. Second, it introduces the competence-control framework and suggests operational measures for control and competence. Third, it discusses preliminary findings along with current limitations and challenges.

Speaker: Jean Marie Reure (University of Genoa)

10:40 Beyond Exit: Examining Protégés' Intra-Alliance Bargaining Strategies

Military alliances are often seen as hierarchical security institutions where powerful patrons use ‘sticks’ (e.g., threats of abandonment) and ‘carrots’ (e.g., reassurance) to shape the policies of their protégés. However, alliance dynamics are not one-sided. Institutionalized alliances provide protégés with opportunities to bargain for better terms, rather than merely accepting their patron’s preferences or leaving the alliance. Weaker states employ intra-alliance bargaining strategies, such as voicing criticism of the alliance patron, abstaining from military exercises, delaying cooperation, or even evicting allied troops, to extract concessions from their patron.

This research investigates the bargaining strategies of alliance protégés vis-à-vis their patrons. It develops a typology of bargaining strategies available to protégés and presents data on their use. Second, the study examines under what conditions these bargaining attempts are effective. Drawing on the case of Armenia's within the Collective Security Treaty Organization - including its absence from CSTO activities and threats to withdraw - this study explores when states choose bargaining over exit and what makes such bargaining effective. By identifying when and how protégés can successfully bargain with their alliance patrons, this research contributes to a better understanding of intra-alliance dynamics and provides insights for policymakers to build enduring security institutions.

Speaker: Maximilian Krebs (University of Greifswald)

11:00 Advancing authoritarian alignment? A systematic mapping of defense diplomacy between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran

In late 2024, the heated debate about an emerging alliance between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which had started among U.S. think tankers, reached European policymakers and the public. At first sight, cooperation between these countries appears predominately bilateral and largely focused on support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, systematic empirical research about emerging security ties between these four authoritarian powers is lacking. This paper maps defense cooperation among the four states to start filling this gap. It examines the extent to which these states engage in defense diplomacy activities, including official contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials, appointment of defense attaches, bilateral defense cooperation agreements, training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel, provision of expertise and advice, contacts and exchanges between military personnel and ship visits, placement of military/civilian personnel in partner countries’ defense ministries and armed forces, deployment of training teams, provision of military equipment and other material aid as well as bilateral and multilateral training exercises. Robust links in defense diplomacy between the four countries would indicate growing security ties that might develop into a full-fledged alliance. If that was the case, severe consequences for escalating conflicts around Taiwan, on the Korean peninsula, or in the Middle East are to be expected.

Speaker: Sabine Mokry (IFSH)

Draft EISS_S.Mokry.pdf

10:00 → 11:25 European Transformations in the Organization of Security

With Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 has not only territorial warfare returned to Europe, but previous trends towards hybrid forms of warfare have dramatically accelerated. This panel will address how European states have responded to this new strategic environment. We ask whether, how and why have these trends transformed the organization of national security. The conventional wisdom holds that the return of territorial warfare in Europe drives ‘positive’ security state-building, i.e. (re-)establishing coercive state capacities (esp. armed forces). Yet, in fact, the evolving picture is more complicated. As European states face conventional and hybrid threats, they often combine the build-up of state coercive capacities with extensive civil-military collaboration. Private actors become key to the accomplishment of public tasks. In the Nordic states, for instance, governments have incentivized so called ‘total defence schemes’, which strongly call for an expansion of the regulatory security state. Moreover, experts are increasingly integrated into the organization of security – not only at the elite level, but effective responses to hybrid threats require a more inclusive approach to provide security at the societal level as a whole. This panel seeks for paper contributions that map these transformations and attempt to explain them on the basis of diverse methodologies in security studies.

Convener: Moritz Weiss (LMU Munich)

10:00 Belgium’s Defence Policy After the Invasion of Ukraine: A Free Rider’s Business-as-Usual Approach

Belgium is widely known as one of NATO’s most persistent free riders, deprioritizing military investments for decades. Successive budget cuts have left its armed forces weakened and ill-prepared for major geopolitical shifts. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine significantly disrupted the European security order, raising the question: to what extent did this external shock lead to a substantive shift in Belgium’s defence policy? While Belgium swiftly condemned the invasion and aligned with NATO and EU-led initiatives structural constraints - underinvestment, a fragmented political system, and a political elite largely disengaged from defence matters - prevented a substantial policy shift.

This paper argues that, despite the external geopolitical shock, policy responses remained largely confined to a traditional reliance on multilateralism and minimal military spending. Although the war prompted minor adjustments, such as a stronger focus on NATO’s Eastern flank over its previous attention to the Sahel, these changes were not transformative. Initial plans to reach the NATO norm of 2% GDP in defence spending by 2035 remained in place, with acceleration to 2029 occurring only after a new federal government took office in 2025. Geographic security and longstanding political inertia continue to limit meaningful adaptation to a shifting security landscape. By examining this case as an example of entrenched free riding, this paper contributes to broader debates on military burden sharing, the ability of smaller states to adapt to shifting geopolitical realities, and the resulting challenges for intra-European defence cooperation.

Speakers: Michelle Haas, Tim Haesebrouck (Ghent University)

10:20 PARADIGM PARADOX: HOW EMERGING CYBERSECURITY COMMUNITIES MODERATE EU GOVERNANCE

While interaction between public and private actors is daily fare in European Union (EU) cybersecurity governance, two contrary paradigms pervade discursive rhetoric. On the one hand, a co-regulatory, inclusive allure of multistakeholderism. On the other hand, state-centric and autarkic ideas of digital sovereignty. Surprisingly little is known about links between – often informal – public-private interaction and high-level rhetoric. Given this: What explains public-private alignment behind contrary paradigms?

This paper makes the case that overlooked everyday struggles over authority pre-empt better understanding of ordering processes around digital infrastructure. Integrating practice-theoretical thinking with cybersecurity scholarship, the paper introduces the framework of emerging cybersecurity community (ECC). The ECC framework enables a new understanding of the puzzling disconnect between the aligned everyday practices of interaction, and the contrary governance paradigms – sovereignist and multistakeholderist. The complementary theories congruence analysis helps juxtapose the Brussels effect with norm entrepreneurship theorising. Surfacing explanatory shortcomings of these alternative accounts for either hybrid public or private influence illustrate ECC’s utility for integrating both. The framework systematises cluttered understandings of interests, institutionalisation, and technopolitical interdependencies. Zooming in on the domain of EU cybersecurity governance offers a context-sensitive window for this paper as a point of departure for filling a broader gap in extant literature on public-private interaction across governance domains.

Speaker: Hannah-Sophie Weber (University of Oxford)

10:40 Geopolitical Europe: The European Union as a signaling actor in the Russia-Ukraine war

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 posed a significant challenge to European foreign policy. The war forced the EU to react and resulted according to some in a geopolitical shift in EU foreign policy. Several institutions and high-ranking officials, including the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Policy, argued that the EU should become a geopolitical actor that knows how to execute hard power. This paper explores one element of the supposed geopolitical turn in EU foreign policy. It analyzes the EU’s signaling (strategic communication) to Russia, the USA and NATO and aims to answer the question to what extent the signaling actually represents a geopolitical turn depending on the audience it is talking to.

Speaker: Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University)

11:00 ’Total Defence’ and Transformations in the Making of European Security

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has become abundantly clear that territorial aggression and large-scale international war are back in Europe. The conventional narrative in research on European security policymaking holds that this provides an impetus for the (re-)building of centralized coercive capacities within “positive” security states. With the return of territorial aggression, the idea of the state as the key provider of national security seems to be back. At the same time, European states – first of all Nordic and Baltic vanguards, but also Continental European countries – have reinvigorated “Total Defence” (TD) or “comprehensive security” concepts. TD reflects a “whole-of-government and whole-of-society” concept of security policymaking that aims at extensive cross-sectoral collaboration. Against the backdrop of these seemingly contradictory trends, we ask: How do evolving threats shape European ways of organizing national security and how do the resulting organizing concepts impact on the authority foundations and policy instruments of European security states? Bringing together research on TD and types of security states, we argue that contemporary territorial and hybrid threats drive the (re-)emergence of TD as an organizing concept for the making of security in Europe. TD in turn entails decentralized and pluralist notions of epistemic authority and regulation-based policy instruments to orchestrate diverse public and private experts. Thus, contemporary security threats and ensuing TD concepts contribute to regulatory security statehood and network-based security governance. Our key contributions are to specify the links between 1) types of security threats and the (re-)emergence of TD and 2) between TD and the evolving authority foundations and policy instruments of European security states. We thereby challenge the conventional narrative of centralized state capacity-building in a reshuffled European security landscape on theoretical grounds and by referring to ample illustrative evidence from the Nordic, Baltic and Continental European countries.

Speaker: Dr Andreas Kruck (LMU Munich)

Berndtsson_Kruck_Weiss_abstract for EISS.docx

11:30 → 13:00 Defence Cooperation and Military Assistance: New Research Directions

For nearly all states, various forms of defence cooperation and military assistance are central to their national security policies. This can take the form of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, or of more structured and institutional cooperation through organisations such as the African Union, the EU, NATO, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of various forms of defence cooperation or military assistance, often on a regional or sub-regional level. It can also take a variety of forms, from joint military training and exercises to operational planning, procurement, and defence-industrial research. This panel invites papers on defence cooperation and military assistance in a broad and inclusive sense, from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and of analytical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. Papers may cover: responses to traditional security threats (Russia’s military assertiveness or China’s rise, etc.), or more diffuse risks and challenges (terrorism, proliferation, human smuggling and the impact of global climate change). Papers may also cover the creation and evolution of defence institutions, cooperation arrangements whether in bi-, tri-, or ‘minilateral’ ways and, last but not least, the organisational and operational aspects of innovation within the context of defence cooperation.

Convener: John Helferich (EISS)

11:30 Sweden and the League of Nations: The partisan contestation of national identity and collective security

When the Swedish Social Democratic Party shifted its stance on NATO membership in the spring of 2022, broad parliamentary consensus to divert from Sweden’s tradition of non-alignment to pursue collective security was achieved. A century earlier Sweden had contemplated similar trade-offs before joining the world’s first international organisation based on the principles of conflict mediation, disarmament, and collective action. Yet, neither in 2022 nor in 1920 such decisions were taken without opposition. This paper explores Sweden’s engagements in the League of Nations, and places its recent divergence from the traditional non-alignment policy in a historical perspective. While the options before the First World War had been between national neutrality or military alliance, the question was to what extent Sweden should have trust in collective security. Special attention is therefore given to Sweden’s participation in the LoN in times of crisis and conflict, including critics’ responses to these engagements. An emphasis is placed on how the small and post-neutral state made sense of the dilemma between its traditional security practices and the new internationalist ideals. Drawing on a wide range of archival sources, the paper illustrates how contestation often took place across dimensions of partisan affiliation and ideological discourse, generating both shared and competing understandings of Sweden’s role and identity in institutionalised international cooperation on issues of security and defence.

Speaker: Zigne Edström (Stockholm University)

11:50 Small State Defense Cooperation and Security Strategies in a Changing Global Order

This paper examines how small states adapt their defense strategies in a shifting global order shaped by intensifying great power competition, emerging regionalisms, and evolving security dynamics. It argues that small states enhance their defense posture through a mix of hard and soft balancing, shelter-seeking, and diversified security partnerships. Using Greece as a case study, the paper explores how it navigates regional tensions with Turkey while balancing ties with key allies such as the EU, the U.S., and France. Through defense agreements, strategic investments, and regional minilateral initiatives, Greece illustrates how small states can leverage multiple partnerships to bolster security and status. Despite growing security pressures, small states also gain agency through networked cooperation and strategic diversification. The findings contribute to the broader discussion on small state security, demonstrating how adaptive defense strategies can mitigate vulnerabilities in an unpredictable international environment.

Speaker: Revecca Pedi (University of Macedonia)

12:10 Common Threat, Diverging Responses? Explaining European States’ Military Spending After the War in Ukraine

Defence cooperation - whether through NATO, the EU, or bilateral and multilateral arrangements -plays a crucial role in national security across all European states. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the importance of military preparedness. However, after three years of war, it is clear that European responses in terms of defence spending have varied significantly. While some countries have substantially increased their military budgets, others have shown only modest adjustments. This paper applies Coincidence Analysis (CNA) to explain these diverging trajectories in European defence spending following Russia’s war in Ukraine. Integrating insights from the literature on military burden sharing and defence economics, we develop a theoretical framework that combines international-level factors, such as threat perception, with domestic-level drivers, including government ideology and fiscal constraints. Our findings indicate that the strongest increases in defence spending occurred in states facing an acute territorial threat from Russia, as well in those that face a significant - though not a territorial - threat, and had previously underinvested in defence. Countries with only moderate threat perceptions but low fiscal constraints and low defence budgets saw intermediate increases, while those facing moderate threats, high existing defence expenditures, or severe fiscal limitations made only minor adjustments. These results suggest the emergence of a three-speed Europe in defence, which can be expected to significantly impact future defence cooperation across the continent: (1) a small group of strong spenders, (2) a large middle group aligning their investments with economic capacity, and (3) a cluster of “free-riders” falling behind. Our study contributes to the broader debate on defence cooperation by illustrating how external threats interact with domestic political and economic factors in shaping national defence policies.

Speakers: Michelle Haas, Tim Haesebrouck (Ghent University)

12:30 Informal is the New Normal: Command and Control as the Choice for the Functional Source of Security Commitment

Since the end of the Cold War, the decline in the formation of formal treaty-based alliances has coincided with a volatile security environment and the rise of network-enabled military capabilities. Developments such as the US push to prepare for network-centric warfare since the late 1990s, the growing interest in developing weapons systems through partnerships, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact, and Switzerland and Singapore’s decisions to procure F-35s, which feature improved situational awareness through advanced sensor-to-shooter connectivity, highlight a shift toward informal alliances. This shift reflects states' significant interest in leveraging technological advancements and establishing arrangements that offer flexibility and adaptability in achieving greater security without the rigid and costly commitments of formal treaties. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain why states choose informal alliances in such conditions. Drawing on institutionalist and functionalist theories of international relations, security studies, and command and control (C2) literature, I argue that the volatile security environment drives states to choose informal alliances because C2 establishes an organizational framework for security commitment that reduces the alliance risks and costs (opportunism, uncertainty, and risks of abandonment or entrapment) while facilitating political-strategic interoperability and operational adaptability between states which enables them to achieve greater security. The C2 framework introduces dimensions that allocate decision rights, designate interaction patterns, specify information distribution, and enable states to exploit and leverage technological opportunities at both the political-strategic and operational levels of interoperability. These dimensions create a “relational-flexibility” framework that links actors’ security commitment at the political-strategic level with the operational level, achieving functional security commitment without requiring binding formal treaties or institutionalized frameworks. This research aims to contribute to alliance studies by addressing gaps in the literature on informal security arrangements and the underexplored role of C2 in shaping alliance behavior, deterrence, and defense objectives.

Speaker: Mr Joseph Christian Agbagala (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)

11:30 → 13:00 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and Arms Control

This panel serves as a platform to present and discuss new research on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In light of Russia‘s nuclear threats and Iran’s growing nuclear program, the panel especially encourages submissions that focus on strategies and institutions to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. The panel aims to bring into conversation scholars from different disciplines, such as political science, history, international law, and science and technology studies (STS), and seeks to facilitate a multidisciplinary dialog on non-proliferation and arms control. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the tension between nuclear disarmament and deterrence; the role of civil society in managing nuclear risks; and international verification. Preference will be given to submissions that have a clear European angle and address both past patterns and current challenges.

Convener: Dr Clara PORTELA (University of Valencia)

11:30 Strategic Stability Without Arms Control

Arms control has increasingly been pronounced “dead.” Indeed, recent empirics are grim. In 2023, Russia unilaterally suspended participation in New START, the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement since the Cold War. While the future of arms control is uncertain, Russia, China, and the United States have expressed nominal interest in maintaining strategic stability. However, strategic stability has largely only been considered in contexts with arms control, or as an outcome of technical military strategies and incentives. Is arms control necessary for strategic stability? I conduct a most-similar systems design analysis of the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) to distinguish confounding factors in strategic stability. By holding the end of arms control agreements constant, I measure variation in strategic stability and assess an understudied variable at play: political relationships. Examining the end of arms control agreements allows me to isolate the effects of political relationships on strategic stability in a post-Cold War context. Leveraging evidentiary tests, I identify important interaction effects and find arms control is sufficient but not necessary for strategic stability. Political relationships better explain strategic stability outcomes, suggesting strategic stability is possible without arms control. By critically evaluating the role of arms control in strategic stability, this article applies the concept of strategic stability to a case universe more representative of today’s international geopolitical environment: a world without formal arms control policies.

Speaker: Jamie Withorne (Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo)

EISS 2025 - Strategic Stability Without Arms Control.docx

11:50 The Soviet Union/Russia and the spread of the bomb

What explains the variation in the Soviet Union’s/Russia’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation? While many scholars have examined the US role in the nonproliferation regime, relatively little scholarly research has systematically considered Moscow’s nonproliferation and nuclear assistance policy. By fusing insights from previous nonproliferation theories with literature about Moscow’s understanding of international relations, I develop a novel theoretical framework to explain the variation in Moscow’s commitment to curbing proliferation. It hypothesizes that Moscow’s varying nuclear assistance and safeguards policy toward different states—and thus the variation in its nonproliferation commitment—is best explained by policy-makers’ views and approaches toward differently aligned states: while officials in Moscow feared that adversaries and allies would develop nuclear weapons, they were less concerned about proliferation risks of non-aligned states. I test the theory’s propositions by using statistical analysis and an updated dataset on Soviet/Russian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1955 and 2020 as well as a new score of recipient states’ embeddedness in the nonproliferation regime. Against the backdrop of intensifying great power competition and an assertive Russia whose commitment to nonproliferation is not a foregone conclusion, this article enhances scholarly understanding of Moscow’s role in the nonproliferation regime and the nuclear order.

Speaker: Lydia Wachs (Stockholm University)

12:10 The Universalization of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons : Lessons from the CWC and BWC and the Role of Customary International Law

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) represents a critical step toward global nuclear disarmament, yet its universal adoption faces significant challenges, particularly due to resistance from nuclear-armed states. This paper examines the potential for expanding the TPNW’s adoption by drawing insights from the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), focusing on how customary international law can influence this process.
Through a comparative legal analysis, the paper explores the historical evolution of the CWC and BWC, analyzing how these treaties transitioned from limited regional agreements to near-universal legal instruments. It assesses the role of treaty design, enforcement mechanisms, and state practice in fostering compliance and legitimacy. By examining legal precedents and state responses to these treaties, the paper evaluates whether the TPNW could follow a similar trajectory.
Methodologically, this research relies on a doctrinal analysis of treaty text and state practice, complemented by a review of customary international law principles and relevant case studies. It compares enforcement, verification, and accountability provisions in the CWC and BWC with those in the TPNW to identify legal and institutional gaps that may hinder broader adoption. Additionally, the paper considers state discourse in international forums and legal scholarship to assess emerging norms surrounding nuclear disarmament.
The central question of this research is: Can customary international law and evolving state practice contribute to the universalization of the TPNW? The paper proposes a legal framework based on lessons from the CWC and BWC, suggesting that strengthening customary norms around nuclear non-proliferation could enhance the TPNW’s legal influence and broaden its global acceptance.
By integrating historical precedent with legal analysis, this research offers new insights into how the TPNW could gain wider recognition and legitimacy in the international legal order.

Speaker: Agata Bidas (University of Vienna)

12:30 Changing Pathways to the Bomb

Previous research on whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NPR) works has focused on whether it deters states from seeking nuclear weapons, with mixed results. We investigate an alternative mechanism: by suppressing the global market for nuclear technology, the NPR forces would-be proliferants to build sensitive nuclear facilities on their own and in secret. This should affect both what kind of facilities a state tries to build and how long it takes to complete them, because each state must essentially re-invent the technology for itself. We analyze a newly completed dataset of nuclear facilities and compare it to data on conventional power plants, which are not subject to any nonproliferation regime. We find that the NPR has dramatically increased the time required to build nuclear facilities, relative to what would have occurred in its absence. In aggregate, the regime has prevented thousands of nuclear-state-years, arguably proving that it is enormously effective.

Speaker: Eliza Gheorghe (Bilkent University)

13:00 → 14:00 Lunch

14:00 → 15:25 Defence Cooperation and Military Assistance: Reforms in European Security

For nearly all states, various forms of defence cooperation and military assistance are central to their national security policies. This can take the form of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, or of more structured and institutional cooperation through organisations such as the African Union, the EU, NATO, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of various forms of defence cooperation or military assistance, often on a regional or sub-regional level. It can also take a variety of forms, from joint military training and exercises to operational planning, procurement, and defence-industrial research. This panel invites papers on defence cooperation and military assistance in a broad and inclusive sense, from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and of analytical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. Papers may cover: responses to traditional security threats (Russia’s military assertiveness or China’s rise, etc.), or more diffuse risks and challenges (terrorism, proliferation, human smuggling and the impact of global climate change). Papers may also cover the creation and evolution of defence institutions, cooperation arrangements whether in bi-, tri-, or ‘minilateral’ ways and, last but not least, the organisational and operational aspects of innovation within the context of defence cooperation.

Convener: Prof. Michal Onderco (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

14:00 Reassessing European Security: The drivers of NATO’s response to hybrid threats since 2014

Russia’s actions against Ukraine in 2014 led to a reassessment of the European security environment by the West. NATO reinforced its military presence in Eastern Europe and developed measures to counter hybrid threats, which were strengthened after 2022. Although hybrid threats are not new per se, their use over the past decade has posed new strategic challenges to the West. This paper aims to identify the structural and normative drivers behind NATO's approach to hybrid threats through policy analysis and International Relations theory.
We first map early European responses to hybrid threats and trace NATO's evolving approach. The term 'hybrid threats' often refers to activities that undermine stability without escalating to direct military conflict. Its widespread use, however, tells us little about the underlying drivers of these responses, which remain underexplored.
From a structural standpoint, we assess whether changes in the balance of power and the unexpected use of hybrid threats to achieve political goals made them more central to European security concerns. Drawing on liberal and realist perspectives, we also explore how growing interdependence changes international conflict, increases vulnerability to hybrid threats, and reveals the limits of traditional military responses.
From a normative perspective, we analyze how the evolution of domestic and international norms drove responses to hybrid threats. Addressing conventional and hybrid threats in European states requires enhanced multinational coordination and society-wide security efforts. Hybrid threats, in particular, challenge the logic of proportionality in direct responses and deterrence strategies and prompt a reevaluation of norms such as non-interference or the balance between sovereignty and collective security. Finally, we examine how the erosion of democratic norms within European states has made them more susceptible to hybrid threats, and how NATO’s strategies have evolved to prevent adversaries from exploiting internal divisions and undermining democratic processes without triggering direct military confrontation.

Speaker: Laura Lisboa

14:20 The EU’s Collective Defence Framework: A Law-in-Context Analysis of Article 42.7 TEU Amid the War in Ukraine

Since the onset of the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the European Union (EU) has acted with unity and cohesion, taking unprecedented steps, particularly in defence. Although the illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has re-emphasised the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the backbone of Europe's territorial defence, a legal basis exists for the EU to play a role in collective defence. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty introduced into the EU's constitutional framework a collective defence obligation similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) commits EU Member States to assist one another in the event of armed aggression. Additionally, a solidarity obligation codified in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) requires the EU and its Member States to support any Member State in the event of terrorist attacks. These norms have seemingly attracted little attention from legal scholars. With the war in Ukraine intensifying, concerns over Trump undermining NATO’s mutual security guarantee and the increasing likelihood of military attacks on Europe, understanding how credible the EU’s mutual defence commitment is, how it would be operationalised and how it interplays with the EU’s solidarity commitment, as well as with NATO’s own mutual defence commitment, is of the utmost importance. This paper conducts a law-in-context analysis of the EU’s mutual assistance clause, drawing insights from European security scholarship and paying special attention to the historical, geopolitical, and strategic context in which the clause was adopted and has come to operate. To this end, the 1948 Brussels Treaty, 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, and 2007 Lisbon Treaty will be analysed. EU security strategies and EU-NATO Joint Declarations will also be examined.

Speaker: Federica Fazio (Dublin City University)

15:00 Can European Defence Cooperation Build European Deterrence?

Is the European Union capable of developing a credible European deterrence? This question is more pressing than ever, particularly in light of the second Trump administration and its inclination toward unilateralism. As the war in Ukraine approaches its third year, the EU’s efforts in defence cooperation have intensified—but have they been effective in meeting the evolving security demands? The return of high-intensity, technologically advanced conventional warfare to the European continent has underscored the urgency of collective defence preparedness. Even before February 2022, EU member states had embarked on efforts to deepen interstate defence cooperation and, to some extent, defence integration. However, these initiatives have been cautiously readjusted to address the new strategic realities. Russia’s war against Ukraine has not only tested European security but has also brought direct threats to neighboring EU states. In response, EU member states have acknowledged—at least on paper—the necessity of multi-domain defence capabilities, culminating in a commitment in November 2023 to enhance their collective military readiness. Yet, has this shift translated into tangible progress toward European deterrence? Have EU states adequately responded to both the new defence imperatives and Ukraine’s calls for support? This paper assesses the EU’s progress by examining shifts in its strategic culture, actual responses to the war in Ukraine, and changes in defence priorities and military spending. It suggests that while EU member states have taken steps to enhance defence cooperation and provide moderate military assistance to Ukraine, these efforts have yet to translate into a more ambitious strategy with a meaningful deterrent impact. There's a need for a fundamental transformation in European defence thinking and capability-building—one that extends beyond the current trajectory. If deterrence is the ultimate goal, merely strengthening cooperation will not suffice; a more profound shift in strategic culture and operational readiness is essential.

Speaker: Fotini Bellou (University of Macedonia)

14:00 → 15:25 Political Economy, Technology and the Defence Industry

This panel aims to explore how economic, industrial, and technological dynamics influence defence issues. The war in Ukraine, the strategic competition between China and the United States, and the European quest for strategic autonomy or technological sovereignty (among other factors) highlight how issues related to technological innovation, industrial policy and economic competitiveness are increasingly important for understanding geopolitical competition, and how the traditional distinction between high politics (security) and low politics (economics) is increasingly blurred. Understanding the links between economics, industry and technology is important because we are seeing partly contradictory trends. On the one hand, the return of war to the European continent and the numerous global crises and wars has refocused attention on the productive and innovative capacity of the defence industry and on the fundamental role of the state in directing economic, technological and industrial efforts for security and defence purposes. On the other hand, technological innovation in areas such as artificial intelligence, biotechnologies, cloud computing, machine learning and quantum computing is being driven by a mix of private actors - big tech and start-ups - and in value chains far removed from the traditional defence-industrial pipeline. This panel invites diverse papers that explore the links between political economy, technology, and defence, and welcomes contributions from all theoretical approaches and disciplines. Papers may focus on national, multilateral, or comparative dimensions and may be either empirically rich case studies and/or more theoretical explorations. Contributions may relate to, but are not limited to, the three areas: (1) The role of technological innovation in the security and defence sector; (2) The reconfiguration of the role of private actors (big tech and start-ups) and defence industries and their impact on defence procurement, the defence market and arms transfers; and (3) The role of the state and industrial policy in steering technological innovation and economic competitiveness in the security and defence sector.

Conveners: Kristen Harkness (University of St. Andrews), Marc DeVore (University of St. Andrews)

14:00 Examining the Factors Behind the EU’s Defence Innovation System

The European Union’s defence innovation ambitions have evolved significantly since the early 2000s, driven by an increasing need for technological sovereignty amid the resurgence of great power competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further accelerated interest in defence R&D, drawing greater attention from both the public and private sectors within the EU. Taking the supranational perspective, rather than that of individual member states, this paper offers an inquiry into the current state of the European Union’s defence innovation system by examining the different factors shaping its development. External pressures, including the war in Ukraine and the assertive US foreign policy, act as catalytic factors, creating potential for superior defence innovation outcomes. A strong human capital base underpinned by academia and a network of technology hubs also contributes to the development of the defence innovation system. At the other end of the spectrum are the institutional factors. However, institutional constraints, including a complex regulatory environment and rigid public procurement processes, pose challenges to both public and private investment in defence R&D, limiting the EU’s ability to fully leverage its defence innovation potential.

Speaker: Cezary Wereszko (University of Nottingham)

14:20 Russian Countertrade as a Mechanism for Promoting Arms Sales and Diplomatic Influence

Why and how does Russia engage in the arms trade? Scholars have
largely focused on why Russia participates in the arms trade, often
neglecting the equally crucial question of how it conducts this trade. Yet, understanding the mechanisms by which Russia promotes arms sales
provides deeper insights into why it does so. While many portray Russia’s arms trade as driven by economic or strategic motivations, few examine the specific tools it employs, particularly defense countertrade, which includes non-monetary barter, counter-purchase obligations, and industrial or technological investments (offsets). This paper fills that gap by offering an eight-decade perspective on Russian arms trade practices, drawing on data and case studies to uncover a more nuanced set of motives. Russia integrates economic and political objectives in its arms trade, seeking not only to outcompete Western suppliers but also to expand or regain influence in various regions, circumvent Western-imposed sanctions, secure access to valuable resources, and sustain its military capabilities. Although barter and technological cooperation have long been part of its trade practices, Russia has only recently adopted offset practices in a systematic way. By leveraging defense countertrade,Moscow aims to stabilize, and potentially grow, its arms exports as global conditions shift.

Speaker: Dr Jonata Anicetti (LISD, Princeton University)

14:40 Innovation and engineering at the front: the Ukrainian case of Unmanned Systems

This paper aims to answer who has been at the centre of the development of Unmanned Systems in Ukraine following February 2022, and how these actors have become organised into constellations that enhance military adaptability. With private actors being central as funders, producers and suppliers of drones, Ukraine demonstrates the contemporary role of the state and the military in guiding and facilitating defence technological innovation. Using a case study approach, it provides an in-depth look at the Ukrainian efforts and challenges of rapidly scaling and localising the production of drones during the war, paying special attention to the role of engineer-soldier collaboration in facilitating continuous development.

The Ukrainian example highlights that much of the innovative power is found in start-ups and industries outside the traditional defence-industrial pipeline, necessitating new solutions to bridge the gap. Realising the value of these actors, however, has relied on novel collaboration patterns. Initially, bottom-up initiatives by NGOs and volunteers dominated. While these demonstrated the operational potential of Unmanned Systems, the ad hoc nature hindered scaling.

Gearing the bureaucratic infrastructure, including within the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the defence procurement agency, to sustain innovation required new defence industrial strategies and significant changes to processes and organisation, including the formation of the Unmanned Systems Force and industry-platforms like Brave1. This provides an example of large-scale and sustained military innovation in wartime. Studying these constellations of actors that have jointly contributed to the development and deployment of Unmanned Systems showcases concrete mechanisms for enhancing innovative capacity for defence purposes.

Based on this empirically grounded examination, I argue that in an unpredictable strategic environment, boosting military adaptability that leverages the potential for rapid development of software-based systems requires the establishment of conduits to ease access for private companies to military feedback and testing prior to tender-based procurement.

Speaker: Emilie Berthelsen (Royal Danish Defence College & Technical University of Denmark)

15:00 Dynamics of Defense Indigenization: state-private relations in India’s quest for self-reliance

In an era of hostile geopolitics, states of all stripes are striving to fortify domestic defense industries and secure defense supply lines. Despite increasing scholarly attention on national strategies of self-reliance—especially in rising powers in the global south—the concept and its associated policy of ‘defense indigenization’ (DI) remains little understood on a conceptual and empirical level. Notably, authors have studied broad variations in DI policies across states, while neglecting shifts in the roles of state and private actors over time. This fails to account for the complex and puzzling mix of protectionist and open-market liberalization policies that underlie many national DI strategies, warranting a deeper analysis of ongoing reconfigurations in the competencies of key defense industrial players. Using a case study of the Indian defense industry, this paper provides a unique conceptualization of DI that challenges current statist analyses and explores evolving state-private dynamics in contemporary DI approaches.

Since 2014, under the Modi government, India has seemingly undergone renewed efforts at indigenization, central to which is the further liberalization of its otherwise state-led defense industry. In a systematic mapping of major weapons production, I track historical developments in DI policy and assess whether the “Make in India” campaign represents a critical juncture in state-private defense industrial relations. The findings suggest that India is on the cusp of major defense industrial transformations in its path to self-reliance, constituting an expanded role for the private sector despite persistent institutional and structural constraints. This empirical mapping can offer valuable insights into the political and industrial drivers of DI in rising powers in the Global South. The paper holds serious policy implications for India and other rising powers’ strategic positioning in the global order, contributing to broader debates in political economy and defense/security studies.

Speaker: Yagnyashri Kodaru

15:30 → 16:55 Roundtable 2: How to Publish in Security Journals

Convener: Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University)

17:00 → 17:30 Poster session / Coffee break

● “Following the Algorithmic Path to Extremism: How Social Network Analysis Can Help to Target Extremist Content Online”
Clara Jammot, King's College London - Department of War Studies
● “Early-Stage Innovation and the Self-Enforcement of National Security Policy: The Case of Foreign Direct Investment Screening”
Nicholas Bahrich, ETH Zurich
● "Digital influence as a continuum: how Russia shapes Georgia’s information environment",
Appoline Roy, GEODE

17:30 → 17:45 Award: Award of the European Security Studies Best Paper Prize

17:45 → 18:00 Concluding Remarks

Conveners: Dr Hugo Meijer (Sciences Po CERI), Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University), Revecca Pedi (University of Macedonia)

18:00 → 19:00 Cocktail