Description
Why do states refuse offers to host nuclear weapons on their soil? Much of the theoretical and conceptual focus on foreign nuclear deployment has been on the ‘patron’ or deploying state, or on the strategic incentives behind deployment patterns. While these are important explanatory factors, this paper argues that the role of the host state and its domestic politics need to be analyzed in greater depth to fully understand foreign nuclear deployment outcomes in NATO. This paper uses comparative case studies to develop a theory of host state refusal, examining cases of deployment and non-deployment of American nuclear weapons to NATO allies during the late 1950s and early 1960s. I argue that domestic factors within the host state are important for understanding cases of non-deployment. I highlight the role of anti-nuclear and nationalist sentiment as well as the role of elites in managing the domestic politicization of foreign nuclear deployment. First, I categorize NATO allies into cases of deployment and non-deployment. Next, I demonstrate that US interest in deployment is necessary, but not sufficient for determining nuclear deployment outcomes in NATO. Then, through process tracing and consulting available archives, I find that domestic factors contributed to host state refusal or to the prevention of a deployment offer in several cases, focusing on Iceland, Norway, and mainland Denmark. Finally, I consider the role of domestic politics in nuclear acceptance and why anti-nuclear sentiment did not prevent NATO nuclear sharing in Germany in the late 1950s. This paper utilizes archival material from the Norstad Papers, the US State Department Central Files, the Digital National Security Archive, and the Foreign Relations of the United States series.