2026 European Security Studies ConferenceAnnual Conference

11 Jun 2026, 08:00 → 12 Jun 2026, 20:00 Europe/Stockholm

Stockholm University

Julia Carver (University of Oxford), Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

Welcome to the 2026 European Security Studies Conference, jointly organized by the COST Action NetSec, the European Initiative for Security Studies, and Stockholm University!

This is our largest event, bringing together hundreds of academics, graduate students, and policy-makers.

The Conference is structured around two categories of panels. Closed panels are recurring year-over-year and are pre-established by the EISS. Open panels are proposed by participants. They are intended to broaden the range of existing themes in the EISS and to provide the community with the chance to uniquely shape the programme and content of the Conference.

CfP Document (Permalink)

Livestreaming Day 1 (Keynotes & Roundtables)

Livestreaming Day 2 (Keynotes & Roundtables)

Thursday 11 June

09:00 Registration and Coffee

Introductory Remarks

Introductory Remarks by
A welcome to Stockholm: Hans Aldolfsson, Stockholm University & Magnus Petersson, Stockholm University
A New Age for Security Studies in Europe: Hugo Meijer, Sciences Po
A Welcome to the Conference: Julia Carver, Leiden University & Sanne Verschuren, Boston University

Conveners: Dr Hans Aldolfsson, Dr Hugo Meijer (Sciences Po CERI), Julia Carver (Leiden University), Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University), Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University), Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

Taking Stock of European Security in a Rapidly Changing Geopolitical Environment

Convener: Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

Virtually Transformed? Digital Infrastructures, Competition, and Governance

Convener: Julia Carver (University of Oxford)

1 Knowing cybersecurity: The epistemic infrastructural power of big tech

Big tech companies authoritatively produce data, information, and knowledge about cybersecurity threats to individuals, businesses, and states. But how do they render international cybersecurity phenomena knowable? Through which practices, means, and devices is this knowledge generated? This paper argues that examining the epistemic infrastructural power of big tech companies addresses these questions. Drawing on International Relations and Science and Technology Studies scholarship highlighting infrastructure’s role in knowledge production, the paper first conceptualizes epistemic infrastructural power. Second, it integrates this conceptualization with big tech companies’ unique position forming the infrastructural core of digitized societies, economies, and lives, alongside existing analysis of their security governance role. This develops a conceptual lens enabling exploration of diverse empirical manifestations of big tech epistemic infrastructural power, particularly regarding cybersecurity knowledge production and performativity. This matters politically because cybersecurity knowledge production is not a neutral or a-political endeavor, but a type of practice that co-constitutes entities and relations in the world by naming, categorizing, producing, and presenting specific realities or truths, serving as references for governance and policy decisions and practices. Third, the paper demonstrates this analytical framework's value by exploring Microsoft’s cybersecurity knowledge production during the Ukraine war. Extensive use of Microsoft products in Ukrainian public and private digital infrastructure enabled the company to collect, monitor, and analyze data about malicious network activities, positioning Microsoft as a significant gatekeeper and communicator of war-related cybersecurity knowledge. The paper concludes by reflecting on what governance object cybersecurity becomes through these dynamics and discussing wider implications for global security governance. The analysis reveals how big tech companies’ infrastructural position grants them distinctive epistemic authority in defining cybersecurity threats and shaping corresponding governance responses, raising critical questions about knowledge power in contemporary international security.

Speaker: Tobias Liebetrau (University of Copenhagen)

2 Governing cybersecurity and the politics of state control in the digital age

Digital technologies have become deeply entangled with the fabric of contemporary societies. Data infrastructures and cybersecurity practices underpin not only economic activity but also state authority and national security. This growing entanglement gives rise to a central question: how are states reorganizing their authority structures and cybersecurity policies, when digital infrastructures are simultaneously strategic assets and commercial commodities?
To address this question, we develop a comparative framework investigating how states design cybersecurity policies across institutional and technological contexts. We distinguish between centralized or fragmented authority, on the one hand, and capacities-based or rules-based cybersecurity policies, on the other. These distinctions serve us as a typology of state control over cybersecurity. First, ‘controllers’ possess the ultimate authority and capacity to command and control. Second, ‘custodians’ set agendas and align a variety of government actors without delegation. Third, ‘incentivizers’ influence third-party behavior indirectly through mostly material and legal incentives. Fourth, ‘managers’ exercise delegated authority over day-to-day implementation. We argue that the evolution of these models is shaped by the interaction of two factors: the demand for securing cyberspace and technological complexity.
Empirically, we take a longue durée and focus on a single rising power, India. We analyze the temporal evolution of cybersecurity governance within India from 1950 to 2025, with a focus on information and communication technologies (ICT) – the backbone of all digital infrastructures. We identify four phases, each corresponding to one of our four types of state control.
Our case study illustrates the politics of digital infrastructures. While less state control redistributes power to firms embedded in critical infrastructures, but also creates incentives for regulatory capture, states simultaneously seek to retain control through coercive backstops and “kill switches”. The paper thus speaks to broader debates on the hybrid ordering of security in the information age.

Speaker: Moritz Weiss (LMU Munich)

3 A Typology of Small State Agency: Southeast Asian States in US-China Submarine Cable Competition

How do small and middle powers preserve autonomy amid great-power competition in critical digital infrastructure? This paper addresses this foundational question in International Relations by examining Southeast Asian states' navigation of US-China rivalry in submarine cable governance. Drawing on semi-structured interviews and comparative case analysis of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, we develop a typology of small state agency identifying three distinct mechanisms through which secondary states shape infrastructure outcomes: coordinating agency (leveraging technical excellence and network centrality), adaptive agency (strategic diversification amid vulnerability), and gatekeeping agency (imposing strict legal requirements leveraging geographic indispensability). Our analysis reveals that different combinations of institutional capacity, strategic network position, and perceived security vulnerability produce distinct agency types. This research contributes to small state scholarship by demonstrating that secondary states are not merely caught in great-power technological rivalry but actively craft pathways to preserve autonomy and advance national interests—even in domains where material power asymmetries are vast. The findings challenge binary narratives of US-China competition and illuminate the polycentric character of contemporary geopolitics, where regulatory authority, strategic position, and proactive diversification serve as instruments of influence that constrain great powers.

Speakers: Barbora Valockova (National University of Singapore), Ms Mae Chow (National University of Singapore)

4 Do Parliaments Dream of Cyber Power? Parliamentary Scrutiny in the Strategic Domain of Cyberspace

Cybersecurity has become central to strategic competition and foreign policy, yet research has focused primarily on executive decision-making, military doctrines, and national cyber strategies, marginalising parliamentary roles in this securitised and technically complex domain. This paper examines how legislatures scrutinise cyber policy in democratic systems.
Using the framework of authority, ability, and attitude, the paper conceptualises parliamentary scrutiny as a form of strategic oversight shaped by legal prerogatives, institutional capacities, and political incentives. Building on the literature on parliamentary war powers and intelligence oversight, it shows how cyber policy blurs boundaries between defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure governance, thereby challenging established mechanisms of democratic accountability.
The study relies on an original dataset of EU cybersecurity policies and a comparative analysis of five cases: the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. Combining text-as-data techniques, parliamentary metadata, and Institutional Grammar 2.0, it examines who speaks about cyber policy, how extensively, and with which institutional powers. The findings reveal substantial variation in parliamentary scrutiny, shaped by institutional arrangements, strategic ambiguity, and executive dominance.
By situating cyber policy within debates on civil–military relations and foreign policy decision-making, the paper advances understanding of democratic oversight in emerging strategic domains.

Speaker: Mattia Sguazzini (University of Genova, Italy)

11:25 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

War Abroad: War and Peace Abroad: Security Assistance, Multilateral Operations, and Peace-Building

With the winding down of large-scale boots-on-the-ground multinational missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has become apparent in both policy and academic circles that large-scale military interventions are but one option among others. Many other kinds of military interventions have been and are being launched and implemented, ranging from military assistance, to more ‘agile’ counterinsurgency, drone fighting, peacekeeping, and aerial interventions, among others. Recent work has investigated the politics of forming multinational coalitions for launching military interventions. Other contributions have explored the politics of implementation, looking at caveats and actual behavior of troops on the ground. A third strand has explored the implication of military interventions for the civil-military relations of the home country when those soldiers return home. Notwithstanding recent advances, within the field of security studies, there is little clarity about the conceptual, theoretical and empirical underpinnings of different kinds of military interventions with important implications for both scholarship and policy. This panel welcomes contributions on different types of military interventions and potential comparisons. Contributions are welcome from a variety of disciplines (history, political science, sociology, etc.) and may shed light on conceptual, theoretical and empirical aspects of the ongoing debate on military interventions within the security studies debate in dialogue with other neighboring fields such as peace and conflict research, war studies and military sociology.

Convener: Kersti Larsdotter (Swedish Defense University)

5 Mapping Plural Visions of Peace: The Peace Cube as an Analytical Framework

Recent debates in peacebuilding have moved beyond the liberal peace paradigm to emphasize plural, locally grounded understandings of peace. However, despite this “local turn,” the field still lacks systematic tools for conceptualizing and comparing diverse visions of peace across actors and contexts. This article addresses this gap by proposing a new conceptual framework - the peace cube - as an analytical tool to visualize and compare different visions of peace across actors and contexts. Integrating insights from existing typologies that distinguish between levels, domains, and values of peace, the peace cube offers a multidimensional structure that captures the complexity and relational nature of peace visions. The article demonstrates the utility of this model through the case of Colombia, where the Duque government, civil society groups, and feminist actors articulate distinct yet interrelated understandings of peace. By mapping these visions within a shared conceptual space, the peace cube highlights tensions, overlaps, and potential areas of dialogue between competing perspectives. Ultimately, this approach contributes to a more systematic and plural understanding of peace, offering a practical tool for bridging conceptual divides in peacebuilding theory and practice.

Speaker: Yijun Xu (Free University of Berlin)

6 Interpreting Counterterrorism in African Conflict Management

Scholarly attention to the convergence between international conflict management and counterterrorism has expanded significantly, though with an implicit interpretation of the ‘use of force’ logic, and an emphasis on UN peacekeeping’s downsizing of protection and human rights norms in engagement with the concept (Moe, 2021; Geis and Moe, 2023). Furthermore, terrorism-related violence is on an unprecedented rise in Africa, with several armed conflicts being embroiled with jihadist actors. African states over the last decade have increasingly pursued counterterrorism through informal coalitional arrangements and bilateral interventions, characterised by expansive force mandates and minimal accountability mechanisms. This paper advances a structured conceptual framework for understanding counterterrorism in international conflict management by identifying four analytical tensions: (1) militarisation and ‘use of force’; (2) organisational density and overlap in coalitions; (3) organisational capacity for prevention-focused mandates; (4) localised meaning-making and contested legitimacy.

Building on the ADHOCISM dataset (Maglia, Karlsrud & Reykers 2025), we specifically analyse how these tensions manifest across UN-mandated integrated operations, UN-authorised autonomous interventions, and non-UN operations. The goal is to show and explain the critical shift in African conflict governance, characterised by the declining relevance of UN-centric peacekeeping frameworks and a parallel emergence of militarised ad hoc coalitions with differing levels of protection standards.

Speaker: Saurav Narain (Leiden University)

7 Socialized to Cooperate? Foreign Military Training and Coordination in UN Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are inherently multinational and rely on coordination among national contingents with diverse military cultures, doctrines, and rules of engagement. While existing research shows that mission composition and prior in-mission experience shape peacekeeping effectiveness, we know far less about whether coordination begins before deployment. This paper argues that foreign military training functions as a pre-deployment socialization mechanism that fosters cooperation in multinational peacekeeping settings. Drawing on literature on military socialization and coalition learning, we hypothesize that officers who receive foreign military training—particularly in the United States—develop greater trust in multinational command structures and increased willingness to cooperate with foreign counterparts. We test this argument using a mixed-methods design. First, we field an original vignette experiment with 196 Turkish military officers to examine whether U.S.-trained officers are more willing to comply with operational requests from foreign commanders. Second, we complement the experimental evidence with an observational analysis of UN peacekeeping missions from 1990 to 2016, assessing whether missions with higher proportions of U.S.-trained personnel are more effective in reducing battle-related violence. Our findings suggest that foreign military training is associated with greater openness to international cooperation at the individual level and improved coordination at the mission level. These results contribute to debates on peacekeeping effectiveness by highlighting the micro-level social foundations of coalition cohesion and have policy implications for the design of training and exchange programs.

Speaker: Ilker Kalin (Stockholm University)

8 From rebels’ to State’s justice: post-conflict justice choices in 2026 Syria

How do rebels deliver justice when they reach power? This contribution examines post-conflict justice choices in Syria following the political transition of December 2024, focusing on how the new leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa needs to address widespread human rights violations
committed during the al-Assad era. These violations include crimes perpetrated both by the former regime (chemical weapons use, torture in detention centers, disappearances) and by non-state armed actors, notably the Islamic State (genocide of Yazidi community, terrorist violence) as well as other militias like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Ahmad al-Sharaa’s group). Drawing on security studies and transitional justice literature, the paper analyzes the emerging Syrian justice architecture and explores how choices of retributive or restorative justice affect stabilization and violence prevention in post-conflict Syria, i.e., how justice choices impact “security.” The analysis examines retributive justice initiatives, including the use of universal jurisdiction by
courts in Germany and the United States, alongside the reactivation of Syrian national courts to prosecute serious crimes committed by the former regime and the Islamic State. It assesses how the al-Sharaa’s regime frames these retributive choices within a rather standard conception of security governance, focused on two ends: bringing stabilization (by preventing further violence), and consolidating institutions (to deter further violence). The paper contrasts these choices with restorative justice mechanisms also largely introduced by
the new authorities, such as the National Commission for Missing Persons and the National Commission for Transitional Justice. These restorative approaches focus on reconciliation; According to the al-Sharaa’s government, they aim to rebuild trust between civilians and institutions, rather advancing a “human” understanding of security.
Will al-Sharaa prosecute crimes by militias (including those of HTS)? Which and whose crimes will be prosecuted?

Speaker: Marie Robin (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)

11:25 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

12:00 Lunch

Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World: From Deterrence to Arms Control

This panel focuses on the interplay between military technology and global security – and how scholars study it. Emerging technologies are unquestionably shaping the ways in which policy makers, military, and industry do security and defence. New developments in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, hypersonics, quantum computing, and space technology are projected to have transformative – even disruptive – effects on strategic stability, military innovation, defence economics, and the conduct of warfare. Most new military technology is dual use and has commercial origins, widening the spectrum of threats and actors with access to technology thanks to cheaper alternatives to military-grade systems. This trend affects the relations among commercial interests (private companies), scientific thought leaders (epistemic communities), those who weaponize technology (militaries), and those who develop technology policy (political leaders). Research on designing key principles for global technology governance and standards for military applications of emerging technologies is in high demand, while the dynamics between old and new technologies on the battlefields is still poorly understood. At the same time, how we study military technology requires more methodological rigor. Responsible forecasting is yet to moderate exaggerated expectations about military technology’s capabilities, inclinations to technological determinism, and strategic overkills. This panel invites submissions that theoretically and conceptually advance our understanding of how military technology changes the security environment. It encourages diversity in scientific disciplines (political science, sociology, economy, history, philosophy), theories, and methods, since the panel primarily aims to facilitate dialogue between scholars interested in how politics and technology interact.

Convener: Sanne Verschuren (Boston University)

9 Upload Pending? Tradeoffs, Uncertainty, and Damage-Limitation in a Multipolar Age

How does China’s nuclear modernization affect U.S. nuclear strategy? What are the crisis bargaining and crisis stability implications of the emerging nuclear balance between the United States and China? How might the nuclear balance evolve over time? This paper addresses these questions. I argue that by building more hardened targets, China is imposing a damage-limitation tradeoff on the United States. In addition, the deployment pattern of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, the growth of its air defense and counterspace capabilities, the adaptations of its mobile ICBM force, and the development of countermeasures against U.S. ballistic missile defenses are imposing damage-limitation uncertainty.

Achieving meaningful damage-limitation is possible, but it depends on making optimistic assumptions about variables whose value will be difficult to know prior to a counterforce operation and that are likely to grow worse over the course of a conventional war. Plus, even if the United States achieves meaningful damage-limitation, it would leave itself vulnerable to Russia’s nuclear forces. This state of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and China should reduce the crisis bargaining benefits of pursuing a meaningful damage-limitation capability while preserving the potentially escalatory dynamics of such a pursuit. It will also generate an intense cross-domain nuclear arms race in which it will be difficult for the United States to escape a condition of damage-limitation uncertainty despite technological advancements in weapons accuracy and remote sensing of mobile nuclear platforms. More broadly, this research indicates that a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD) will be difficult to sustain, but a condition of damage-limitation uncertainty is potentially durable.

Speaker: Tyler Bowen (United States Naval War College)

UploadPending_Appendix.pdf

Upload Pending_Bowen_082925.docx

10 From Precision to Existential Risk: Hypersonic Weapons and the Erosion of the Conventional–Nuclear Divide

Recent hypersonic weapon technology advances have changed military power, challenging conventional and nuclear warfare distinctions. Hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, promoted as precision, speed, and deterrence, are compressing decision-making timelines, circumventing missile-defence architectures, and blurring strategic stability-underpinning escalation thresholds. This paper examines how hypersonic weapons break the conventional–nuclear divide and introduce existential risk even without nuclear payloads.
The paper has three main points. First, hypersonic weapons undermine warning and response systems, increasing pre-emptive action and launch-on-warning incentives. Second, their integration with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and emerging AI-enabled command-and-control systems increases misperception, automation bias, and accidental escalation, especially in fragile deterrence regions. Third, prestige politics, defense-industrial competition, and perceived vulnerability drive hypersonic development, similar to nuclear arms racing.
The paper uses the Ukraine war, the May 2025 India–Pakistan confrontation, and the Iran–Israel escalation to demonstrate how missile defence saturation, drone integration, and precision-strike doctrines are accelerating offensive dominance. Hypothesising hypersonic weapons as a “conventionally armed strategic force” with WMD-like effects contributes to military innovation and strategic studies.
The paper sheds light on how emerging technologies are changing global security environments and complicating arms-control and risk-reduction efforts by placing hypersonic weapons at the intersection of conventional military innovation and existential security risk.

Speaker: Mr Tahir Azad (Department of Politics & IR, University of Reading, UK)

11 Legitimating the Bomb: US Efforts to Manage Public Information about Nuclear Weapons after World War II

The horrific physical, medical, and environmental effects of nuclear weapons underpin long-standing ideas about nuclear deterrence, as well as challenges to their legitimacy and legality. Yet while US planners anticipated the bomb’s immense physical destruction in Japan 1945, they paid little attention to its probable medical and environmental effects. Instead, it was news reports about radiation in the aftermath of the bombings that first raised public concerns and criticisms about the bomb’s health effects. I show that this criticism prompted US officials to manage publicly-available information about the bomb in order to shape its early reception as a powerful – yet still acceptable – weapon. US efforts took advantage of the unique circumstances around Hiroshima and Nagasaki to emphasize the bomb’s physical destruction but downplay radiation effects to domestic and international audiences. In doing so, they also sought to avoid association with chemical weapons, which had been banned in response to public pressure after World War I. I argue that this information management was central to US efforts to build early public acceptance of nuclear weapons. The findings provide insight into contemporary political debates around nuclear weapons, as well as broader questions about the legitimization of new weapons in international politics.

Speaker: Jennifer Erickson

12 Limit to Win It: A Typology of Competitive Arms Control Practices

Arms control is traditionally conceptualized as a cooperative undertaking, reducing risk and obviating the need for wasteful expenditure. But arms control can also be employed for competitive ends, shaping competition in ways that asymmetrically advantage certain parties. While previous literature has identified individual examples of competitive arms control within certain cases, the full range of competitive arms control practices has not been assessed comprehensively. This paper thus aims to advance the literature by developing a typology through which to categorize and conceptualize eight competitive arms control practices, identifying four mechanisms and two potential target types. The paper first illustrates the validity of the framework by offering illustrative examples of each cell within the typology from various periods of nuclear arms control. It then applies the typology to reevaluate naval arms control in the interwar period, revealing the degree to which national decision-making was driven by competitive, not cooperative, interests. By generating a comprehensive typology of competitive arms control strategies, this work provides a framework through which to reassess historical arms control regimes and from which to evaluate the potential for future arms control under the shadow of renewed great power competition.

Speaker: Samuel Seitz (University of Oxford)

13:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Gender, Politics, and Security

13 Are Tradwives Making Social Reproduction Great Again? How Male Supremacist Women Strengthen Far-Right Extremism, Militarism and War

Non-traditional security challenges are on the rise due, in part, to a growing far-right that interlinks with cyber(in)security. This includes the phenomenon of tradwives, or so-called traditional wives, a growing global movement with origins in the west, who actively further male supremacism, militarism and other forms of violence, even as they are seen as silly and/or non-political. The paper asks: How do tradwives further violent extremism and disinformation through their propaganda? The paper also asks whether the tradwife movement is bolstering societal recognition and appreciation of social reproduction, something that its propaganda suggests that the movement does. From a feminist peace and security perspective that draws on critical terrorism studies, the article examines the understudied yet pivotal role of tradwives in promoting violence and disinformation that feeds not simply essentialized and binary gender norms but highly militarized ones, which contribute to gendered strategic cultures that encourage gendered nationalisms and militarisms. Despite tradwives’ claims otherwise, the paper contests the notion that the movement furthers the value of social reproduction, which is the daily labor that produces and sustains life, carried out overwhelmingly by women and girls globally, and challenges the idea that it is feminists who undermine caring.

Speaker: Crystal Whetstone (Bilkent University)

14 No Woman's Land: Securitisation of Female Forced Migration in Afghanistan

Forced migration is a phenomenon present in globalisation’s dynamics, as is the absence of women in the conceptualisation of the processes that shape the lives of citizens. At the intersection of these two realities, we aim to analyse female forced migration as a security issue, analysing the absence of gender in the definition of forced migrant by the United Nations. From a methodological standpoint, this research draws upon Feminist Security Studies, as it conceptualises the intrinsic relationship between gender and security. These key terms guide the semi-structured interviews with thirty Afghan forced migrant women, methodological instrument used to include the realities of women, in their own words. By conceptualising gender as a social and cultural construct, and acknowledging that it shapes the experiences of forced migrant women, we contextualised the background from which they depart: Afghanistan. More than four decades of war, compounded by the Taliban’s second takeover, have profoundly eroded women’s rights, prompting the forced migration of Afghan women. Three conclusions are drawn. Firstly, for the majority of the interviewed women, as forced migrants, security is linked to protection from gender-based violence, freedom from fear and human rights protection, and gender specific barriers remain overlooked in the migration journey. Secondly, the realities of women are not represented in the definition of forced migrant. The absence of gender leads to a gap in gender-disaggregated data on migrants flows and a lack of acknowledgment of the gendered challenges along the migration journey. Furthermore, it leads to the invisibility of policies that materially impact women’s lives and security. Thirdly, we acknowledge that in a spectrum of non-politicised, through politicised, and to securitised - existential threat, justifying emergency measures beyond normal political procedures - female forced migration is a security issue, as it is a matter of a particular saliency and political urgency.

Speaker: Jéssica da Costa Pereira (NOVA University of Lisbon - School of Social Sciences and Humanities)

Jéssica Pereira_No Woman's Land.pdf

15 Artistic Resilience-Building in Lithuania’s Local Security Policy

Abstract

Lithuanian orphans sing patriotic songs at Šakiai Diakonija, my diaconal workplace, located just a 20-minute drive from the Russian border—and roughly 2 minutes for the medium-range missiles stationed in Kaliningrad. Recentring human security in the investigation of children’s lives at EU borders, this contribution offers valuable insights into pre-conflict preventive security policy.
These Lithuanian Children exemplify the impact of art and music in building social resilience. Their case study reaches beyond the traditional policy programmes implemented in Lithuania, including rearmament policies, civilian drone operation, and evacuation trainings. Non-traditional resilience-building with vulnerable youth at the Russian border emphasises everyday artistic methods, targeting higher psychological resilience and thus offering youth the tools to deal with the adverse impact of rising military tensions and potential armed conflict. This approach aims to prevent severe psychological pathologies, with positive outcomes for both individual lives and national health systems.
Following a localised bottom-up approach to security studies, this qualitative case study touches on novel conflict prevention policies that address children’s lived reality within European security politics. The case study draws on practical social work with orphans, children with disabilities, and vulnerable youth in Lithuania. It is inherently transdisciplinary, employing theory of traditional international relations as well as artistic studies. Building on the feminist-constructivist assumption that the personal and political are two interrelated spheres, it pays attention to the political discourses around Lithuanian state security, and their effect on youth’s personal development. Vice versa, lived realities constitute the starting point in constructing national identities, as evident in children’s selecting patriotic songs for the diaconical Christmas celebration. The transdisciplinary, intersectional feminist perspective thus sheds light on the connections between everyday practices and macro-political security.
All in all, this contribution highlights how a bottom-up, resilience-driven preventive approach to conflict reshapes local security policy.

Speaker: Anna Luisa Reinhardt (Sciences Po, Northern German Lutheran Church, Lithuanian Diakonija)

Reinhardt_Anna Luisa_EISS Closed Panel Proposal.pdf

16 Gendering Non-Traditional Security: A Comparative Analysis of Sexual Violence, Reconciliation and Post-War Development in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia

This paper will focus on the gender-based violence during armed conflicts as a non-traditional security challenge that is affecting the post-conflict development, stability and any peacebuilding effort. The analysis will be situated within feminist studies and will focus on how post-conflict approaches towards policies, reconciliation and reparations need to address sexual violence and the importance of recognising it as a crime that will deeply impact society. Through a comparative case study of Colombia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main focus will be on how the reconciliation frameworks have been implemented and whether the gender layer has also been taken into account while the states have begun their healing process.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though the ICTY has been a role model in the international jurisprudence scene and has defined for the first time since the World War 2 trials the term "rape" as a war crime, the post-conflict resolutions and reconciliation were proven to be too inconsistent in the face of the true destruction the Bosnian War has brought, while also having trouble helping with their survivors.
In the case of Colombia, the non-traditional approach towards gender-based violence during the war has proven to be right, and the transitional justice was incorporated in the peace-building efforts and, later on, the international jurisprudence.

The paper will also focus on the differences between the conflicts. Still, it will highlight the most important factors in which gender-based violence has succeeded: underdevelopment, inequality, patriarchy, but also the issue of land, resources and ethnic conflicts.
Moreover, the importance of gender-based frameworks is proven to be a significant non-traditional security challenge, but when addressed and implemented correctly, it can bring a change in the reconciliation process and also build a more stable and durable post-conflict stability, while still caring for its citizens and survivors.

Speaker: Teodora Stoicescu (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration)

13:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

The Conduct of Contemporary and Future War

Convener: Giles Moon (Oxford University)

17 Learning from Ukraine: The West must be prepared for positional warfare

Speakers: Baptiste Alloui-Cros (Oxford University), Giles Moon (Oxford University)

18 Conceptual Inquiry into Military Deep Operations: A Framework for Analysis

Speakers: Mr Martijn Rouvroije (Netherlands Defence Academy - Faculty of Military Sciences), Martijn Rouvroije (Netherlands Faculty of Military Sciences)

19 Proliferating Punishment: Assessing the Effectiveness of Russia’s Long-Range Drone Strike Campaign

Speakers: Andro Mathewson (KCL), Natalia Henry (UPenn)

20 Working in the Margins: Can Small State Special Operations contribute to Deterrence?

Speaker: Troels Burchall Henningsen (Royal Danish Defence University)

15:00 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

The Politics of Deterrence in Europe: Panel: The Politics of Deterrence in Europe

Convener: Thomas Fraise (University of Copenhagen/Sciences Po)

21 Reconceptualizing nuclear deterrence and national identity: the cases of Finland and Sweden

Speaker: Emma Rosengren (Stockholm University)

22 Ritual deterrence, magic strategies, and nuclear war in Europe

Speaker: Prof. Matthew Evangelista (Cornell University)

23 Nuclear Futures, Utopias, and the Case for a Renewed ‘Strict Sufficiency’

Speaker: Benoît Pelopidas (Sciences Po)

24 Plus ca Change: Continuity in the French Nuclear Approach.

Speaker: july decarpentrie (fhs)

15:00 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Coffee break: Coffee Break

Politics at the Intersection of Climate, Industrialization and Security

Convener: Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University)

25 Water In-Security and Climate Migration in Iraq Analyzing Socio-Economic Threats

The 2018 UN GEO-6 report classified Iraq 5th most climate vulnerable globally and the UN have further warned that by 2035, Iraq may meet only 15% of its total water demand if current severe water crises trends persist. Equally, as latest as September 2025, IOM recorded that 186.00 Iraqi people are displaced due to water scarcity. In 2025, the Iraqi parliament, admitted that massive rural water shortages drive farmers and villagers to cities, Environmental changes in Iraq trigger socio-economic issues. The study is qualitative and exploiting a socio-legal approach, the primary data is in the form of interviews which were conducted with selected respondents (7) of various backgrounds, and secondary data from journal articles, books, and credible online sources were analyzed thematically. This study aims to scrutinise water insecurity and climate migration in Iraq. Study, revealed that Iraq faces a water crisis from declining Tigris-Euphrates flows (down 30–40% since 1980s per FAO 2023), threatening agriculture, and ecosystems. Similarly, study indicates the Iraqi water in-security and environmental decline has had a direct effect on agriculture with wheat and barley production falling by 30–40% during recent drought years and climate-driven displacement is on the rise. The study recommended that there is a need to strengthen Iraq water security strategies to address such threats, Iraq requires urgent reforms, domestically, must establish a national water diplomacy body, Hence, regionally, should leverage its 2023 accession to the UNECE Water Convention by engaging international mediators (like the UN) to negotiate binding water agreements with Turkey and Iran. This study provides valuable insights for policymakers and academic community, contributing to a better understanding of regional security dynamics and strategies, while identifying areas for future examination in water insecurity and climate migration in broader Middle Eastern.

Climate Change, Migration, Water Insecurity, Iraq, Socio-Economic.

Speakers: Ms Dunia Baban (Stockholm University), Saman Omar (College of Humanity, University of Duhok, Kurdistan Region of Iraq)

EISS-2026.docx

26 Living with the nuclear: Spatio-temporal entanglements, nuclear cultures, and the afterlives of uranium mining

This paper examines how uranium mining in East Germany - embedded in the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War - produced specific nuclear cultures that continue to shape the present. Framing the management of nuclear legacies as a local and global security issue, the paper highlights how uranium extraction and its afterlives intersect with environmental, health, and societal security concerns across generations. Drawing on the spatio-temporal entanglements of extraction and post-extractive remediation, the article demonstrates that the ‘nuclear’ is not solely a technological phenomenon but is deeply rooted in everyday life-worlds, social relations, and cultural practices. Precisely because of this embeddedness in the everyday, nuclear legacies emerge as long-term security challenges in which risks may become normalized, rendered invisible, or politically depoliticized.
By analysing ambivalences - between exceptionalism and banalisation, risk and privilege, destruction and infrastructure, secrecy and everyday life, as well as trauma and nostalgia - the paper shows how uranium mining has shaped identity, memory, and regional belonging. Particular attention is paid to the role of knowledge archives, nuclear cultural heritage, and global circulations of expertise, as well as to the challenges posed by long-term radioactive temporalities. In doing so, the paper contributes to a broader understanding of how the nuclear becomes effective in everyday life and how its material and immaterial afterlives can be remembered, communicated, and responsibly shaped across generations. It argues that the governance of nuclear legacies constitutes not only a technical or environmental concern, but a societal and security-relevant task central to safeguarding the well-being of present and future generations.

Speaker: Elisabeth Saar (Hamburg University)

27 Climate Change, Environmental Crime, and the Governance of Non-Traditional Security in Europe

Climate change is increasingly recognized as a critical non-traditional security challenge, reshaping threat perceptions and governance priorities across Europe. Beyond its direct environmental and socio-economic impacts, climate change also acts as a threat multiplier by facilitating the expansion of environmental crime, including illegal logging, wildlife trafficking, waste trafficking, and illicit exploitation of natural resources. This paper examines the intersection between climate change and environmental crime as a complex and underexplored dimension of non-traditional security in the European context.
Drawing on a non-traditional security framework, the paper argues that environmental crime exacerbates climate-induced vulnerabilities by undermining sustainable development, weakening governance structures, and contributing to instability both within and beyond Europe’s borders. Climate stressors such as resource scarcity, extreme weather events, and ecological degradation create permissive environments for criminal networks, while environmental crime, in turn, deepens environmental harm and erodes state and societal resilience. These dynamics pose significant challenges for European security governance, particularly in relation to border management, regulatory enforcement, and transnational cooperation.
The analysis adopts a qualitative approach combining policy analysis of European Union security, climate, and environmental governance frameworks with selected illustrative examples of environmental crime affecting or involving European actors. The paper situates environmental crime within broader debates on human security, resilience, and sustainable development, highlighting how climate change and criminal activity intersect to produce diffuse, cross-border security risks that fall outside traditional military paradigms.
By focusing on governance responses, the paper contributes to ongoing scholarly and policy discussions on how European security institutions are adapting to non-traditional threats. It demonstrates that addressing environmental crime in the context of climate change requires integrated, cross-sectoral strategies that bridge security, development, and environmental policy domains. Ultimately, the paper underscores the need to reconceptualize European security through a holistic lens that recognizes environmental crime and climate change as central security concerns.

Speaker: Cornel Racoveanu (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest)

28 Fragile Control: How De Facto States Degrade Nuclear Security in the Donbas

Nuclear security research treats states as the primary managers of nuclear and radiological risk, with non-state actors as key challengers. This overlooks de facto states - separatist polities that exercise territorial authority without broad recognition. We argue that de facto states create zones of authority without recognised responsibility, weakening regulatory control while remaining partially excluded from global nuclear-security governance. Consequently, they undermine nuclear security through regulatory rupture, expanded illicit opportunities, coercive threats and use of force, and governance exclusion. We test these claims using cross-national event data and a case study of Russian-backed separatist regions in Ukraine.

Speaker: Eliza Gheorghe (Bilkent University)

16:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Conceptualizing Military Strategy: From Planning to War

War has returned to Europe. However, European strategic thinking and understanding of war remain underdeveloped, stemming from a long-standing reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the widespread belief that war was a relic of the past. As European actors grapple with this new reality, now is an opportune moment to critically examine existing knowledge on war and strategy, assess its relevance to contemporary contexts, and encourage innovative perspectives. This panel seeks to serve as a platform for advancing a European debate on the use of force for political purposes. It invites papers addressing war and strategy in a broad and inclusive sense, drawing from a variety of disciplines—such as history, political science, and sociology—and engaging with diverse approaches—from fundamental ontological and theoretical questions (such as, what is war and how do we know?) to empirical analyses examining the specifics of military capabilities and their implications for strategy. Submissions may focus on both historical and contemporary topics and explore various factors shaping strategy, including technological, cultural, social, and environmental influences, moral and ethical considerations, and the role of ideas, discourses, and imaginaries of (future) war in shaping today’s thinking. The panel also encourages innovative engagements with key concepts in strategic studies—such as deterrence, escalation, and violence—and contributions that critically but constructively evaluate the current state of the field or the dynamics and outcomes of knowledge production on war.

Convener: Chiara Libiseller (Leiden University)

29 Fortifying the Eastern Flank: Leveraging Historical Lessons to Create Effective Defence Systems

In early 2024, Poland and the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced plans to put up fortifications along their eastern frontier. Yet one lesson that analysts might draw from contemporary experience is that defensive systems of the sort planned for parts of NATO’s so-called Eastern Flank have little to no utility except for sapping precious resources that could be spent elsewhere. We argue that this skepticism towards fortifications is misguided even though defence establishments must be attuned to the risk of catastrophic failure. A conventional defensive system must have depth and enable the ability to go about counteroffensives. A major reason for the historical failures associated with fortifications is because defenders either did not match the imagination of their adversaries or neglected the value of depth and counterstrike options. For those considering how to fortify the Eastern Flank, they must pair static defences with operational as well as organizational dynamism. We offer a framework for how to think about effective defence systems and use various case studies, two of which are drawn from the First World War, to substantiate our argument. We conclude by teasing the implications of our analysis for how Poland and the three Baltic countries can create effective defence systems.

Speakers: Alexander Lanoszka, Dr Michael Hunzeker (George Mason University)

30 Anticipated Failure: Why States Go to War Un(der)prepared

Why do states engage in wars for which they are un(der)prepared? Specifically, why do states enter wars when they have good reason to expect that they will not be able to achieve their strategic objectives with their chosen war plans? To understand why states would go to war with flawed plans, we need to know two things: (1) what options to modify the flawed initial war plan were available, and (2) how states pick among their available options. I argue that civilian-military buck-passing restricts the options states have to modify their war plans. Furthermore, the limits on a state’s latent power and the extent of its actualized military power affects how the state selects among their restricted options. These arguments are illustrated through an examination of German war planning in World War II. Germany revised their war plans to fix expected flaws for Fall Gelb, but went to war with a plan known to be flawed in Operation Barbarossa.

Speaker: Mariya Grinberg (MIT)

31 Revisiting Multi-Domain Operations: A Historical Reflection on the Respective Roles of Combination and Prioritisation in the Conduct of War

NATO’s new operational concept Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) assumes combining various military and non-military tools is essential and beneficial for winning future wars. In this article, we offer a historical perspective to enunciate the MDO’s underlying philosophy. Specifically, we argue that combining tools is not inherently necessary nor beneficial, and that prioritisation of one tool can prove contextually meaningful. To substantiate our claim, we describe how prioritisation prevailed over combination in different historical contexts and especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2025). Our argument does not imply that prioritization is always preferable, nor that it will prove decisive in future warfare. However, it suggests that NATO should treat prioritisation seriously, and avoid assuming that it will automatically prevail over its adversaries merely by virtue of combining tools. In addition to its practical implications, the argument also improves our theoretical understanding of grand strategy, strategy, and tactics, thus contributing to the current academic debates on these subjects.

Speaker: Dr Samuel Zilincik (Royal Danish Defence College)

32 Influence as Strategic Infrastructure: China, NATO, and Competition Below the Threshold of War

Strategic competition is increasingly unfolding below the threshold of armed conflict, where influence over perception, legitimacy, and coordination might determine the outcomes without the use of force. While widely acknowledged, influence is still treated as an auxiliary component of military and political strategy, framed through information operations or psychological warfare. Furthermore, recent debates appear to have been affected by conceptual inflation, whereby the heavy use of ‘war’ terminology has obscured influence as a distinct strategic arena.

This paper aims to fill this gap through a case study that analyses how China and NATO conceptualise influence as a strategic practice that affects cognition, understood not as individual psychology but as a collective environment in which decisions are made. China and NATO’s strategies are compared as contrasting approaches to the use of influence to exercise power: China's Three Warfares strategy treats cognition as an object of long-term conditioning to limit adversaries’ coordination and advance China’s objectives without open conflict; conversely, NATO approaches cognitive warfare from a defence perspective, emphasizing counter-parts analysis, resilience and ethical considerations.

This comparison reveals that the distinctions between China and NATO are not based on technology or capabilities, but rather on their strategic thinking, which appear to be characterized by a conceptual asymmetry. Because cognition underpins collective sensemaking, interaction between organizations employing different strategic logics may generate misalignment. The latter can result in mismatched comprehension leading to delayed responses, coordination difficulties, and, in situations of persistent competition, an increased risk of escalation.

This paper aims to demonstrate that overlooking cognition as a core strategic variable risks missing how advantage is created in alliance-based security systems long before any force is used, which may produce far-reaching consequences for grand strategy, military planning, and international cooperation.

Speaker: Sara Russo (Centre for High Defence Studies (CASD))

Influence as strategic infrastructure China, NATO, and conflict below the threshold of war.docx

16:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Keynote

Friday 12 June

Geopolitical Power Europe: A Reality Check in Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood

Convener: Filip Ejdus (University of Belgrade)

33 EU’s Ontological Security and Geopolitical Enlargement

Speaker: Nikolaos Tzifakis (University of the Peloponnese)

34 Geopoliticisation of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership: A Role-Theoretical Perspective

Speakers: Marko Kovačević (University of Belgrade), Milan Varda (University of Belgrade), Dr Tijana Rečević Krstić (University of Belgrade)

35 Filling the EU’s Identity Void from Without and Within – Forging a Geopolitics of Values

Speaker: Kurt Bassuener (Democratization Policy Council, Sarajevo)

36 From Normalisation to Strategic Stabilisation: Geopolitisation of the Pristina–Belgrade Dialogue within EU Enlargement

Speakers: Alexandra Prodromidou ((York Europe Campus, Business School, Southeast European Research Centre (SEERC)), Faye Ververidou (York Europe Campus, Business School, Southeast European Research Centre (SEERC)), Filip Ejdus (University of Belgrade), Sonja Stojanovic Gajic (Center for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe, the University of Rijeka and the Centre for International Security of the Faculty of Political Science, the University of Belgrade3)

09:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Roundtable: Navigating the Job Market

Convener: Julia Carver (Leiden University)

Coffee break

Disruptive Machines: AI, Information Operations, and Cyber Security

Convener: Mr Arthur Laudrain (EISS)

37 Resilience-by-Design in the Information Age: Tabletop Evidence on AI-Enabled Cybercrime, Coordination, and Public Trust

Digital technologies are entangling cyber risk, digital infrastructure, and governance. This paper argues that AI-enabled cybercrime is best understood as a transformation of the cybercrime ecosystem rather than merely as a set of new technical tactics. It draws on UC Berkeley’s “AI-Enabled Cybercrime: Exploring Risks, Building Awareness, and Guiding Policy Responses” initiative, supported by the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC) and the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab (BRSL), which combines foresight-based scenario planning with empirical tabletop exercises (TTXs) and broader expert engagement (workshops, interviews, surveys).
Empirically, the paper synthesizes observations from three convenings: the kickoff tabletop exercise at UC Berkeley (December 2024), the Singapore tabletop exercise (October 2025) and the Tel Aviv exercise (December 2025). Participants from government, critical infrastructure, industry, and academia conducted stress tests of AI-generated malware, deepfake-enabled fraud, and accelerated attack chains. The TTXs explored responses ranging from initial breach investigation to disruption scenarios affecting energy, transport, and water systems.
Across the exercises, participants described AI as increasing the “speed, scale, and sophistication” of familiar criminal motives (money, leverage, access) while lowering technical barriers and reinforcing an underground “marketplace” model in which specialized actors coordinate (e.g., access brokers, ransomware negotiators, deepfake vendors). Yet the decisive constraints were institutional and societal: teams debated roles, decision rights, and reporting lines before technical evidence could be validated; communications strategy had to balance transparency against rumor and escalation risks; leaders also emphasized human accountability even when using AI to triage large data volumes.
The paper concludes with a resilience-by-design agenda relevant to European security studies and practice: decision models for action under uncertainty, more straightforward public-private responsibility sharing for critical digital dependencies, and crisis-communication doctrines that protect public trust while preserving rights.

Speaker: Gil Baram (UC Berkeley and Bar Ilan University)

38 Financial (In)Security, TikTok, and the Far-Right Pipeline

While the relationship between far-right extremism, libertarianism, and neoliberalism has long been established, algorithmic recommendation as well as the lucrative professionalisation of content creation are leading platforms like TikTok to impact how financial (in)security feeds into the far-right’s proliferation. The rise in influencers promoting an individualistic ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ alongside aspirational lifestyles that are rooted in politicized identities has encouraged the consumption of narratives and routines that promote far-right values. Drawing on ontological security theory and discourse analysis, this paper asks: how do the ontological (in)security narratives of finance-related content relate to far-right ideology?

Amongst the 3,246 TikTok posts and 19,805 comments analysed for this paper, three main ontological security narratives relate to far-right extremism. The first, and most dominant, interprets the red-pilled concept of ‘breaking out of the matrix’ as the act of achieving freedom from a perceived oppressive financial system by accumulating wealth and material resources. In addition to promoting a neoliberal individualist imperative that aligns with the far-right, this narrative frequently displayed senses of shame due to financial instability. The second narrative draws on far-right conservativism to blend financial aspiration with gender, framing success and financial security as dependent on traditional gender roles (e.g., tradwives) and on extremist masculinist views about romantic partners (e.g., choosing between supportive wives and ‘gold-diggers’). The final narrative focuses on the ‘influencer saviour’ which points to the connection between finance, religion and the far-right – specifically in how users address their own ontological insecurity by relying on, and idolizing, influencers who appear to have achieved financial stability.

At a time of financial insecurity, developing this facet of the online far-right is crucial to not only better understand the radicalization processes threatening democracy but also to identify the topics that policymakers can address to counter the rise of far-right extremism.

Speaker: Clara Jammot

39 Cyber risk logics and their implications for cybersecurity

Cybersecurity in national and international security is frequently discussed in an existential register. However, most cybersecurity activities are normal and routine, including diverse practices of cyber risk management. The intricacies of cyber risk and its connection to security and threat politics have received surprisingly little attention in the cyber politics literature. This article addresses this gap through a twofold theoretical proposition. The first argues that cyber risk in policy and practice inhabits a continuum between ‘classical’ risk and security postures. The second proposes the existence of multiple risk logics, located at different points along this continuum. To illustrate this, we outline two distinct cyber risk logics: ‘risk as potential threats’ and ‘risk as uncertainty’. Through an exploratory case-study of cyber risk policy and guidance in the United Kingdom, we find indications of the simultaneous existence of these risk logics, including in specific organizational contexts. We propose that the ‘risk as potential threats’ logic, in particular, acts as a ‘bridge’ between conventional risk and security. We conclude by discussing how differentiating cyber risk logics facilitates a more finely grained appreciation of cybersecurity policy and practice and provides opportunities for disciplinary engagement with the organizational and institutional politics of cybersecurity and ‘the international’.

Speaker: Sarah Backman (Försvarshögskolan)

40 Amplification of Russian Geopolitical Narratives on VKontakte: Studying Tsargrad’s audience engagement and the construction of the enemy before and after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The paper explores how Russian geopolitical narratives about the national self and the enemy are constructed and amplified on VKontakte (VK) before and after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. VK is the largest social media platform in the Russian Federation, and it is being gradually integrated into a government-led multipurpose application, Max (like WeChat in China). Relying on data scraped from two VK channels, Tsargrad Television and Tsargrad Society (June 2021 – June 2023), the study offers a glimpse into the narratives of more extreme nationalist media outlets, their dissemination, and audience engagement (reactions and comments). Theoretically, the paper is anchored in ontological security studies, narratives, and constructivist approaches to international relations (Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; Hagström, 2019, 2022; Wendt, 1992). It assumes that social media platforms and spaces can act as sites for ontological (in)security construction through narrative promotion, routines, and self-affirming practices. Mixed-methods approach is adopted as user engagement patterns are explored through descriptive statistics identifying most amplified narratives and periods with high activity. Additionally, narrative analysis is applied when analyzing posts with highest number of reactions and their affiliated comments. Unusual spikes of user reactions are observed after February 2022 as particular information campaigns were visible. Amplified narratives often framed Ukraine and the Ukrainian Armed Forces in nationalist terms, while presenting civilians in Eastern Ukraine primarily through a victimhood lens, contributing to a simplified hero–villain narrative during the first eleven months after the start of the invasion. After the initial stage, more diverse narratives re-appeared related to promotion of conservative ideologies and Russia’s geopolitical relations to position the national self. The paper is concerned with the role of digital media and information in non-military warfare and mobilization (Galeotti, 2023; Jonsson & Käihkö, 2025) whilst reflecting on the role of non-human agents in narrative amplification.

Speaker: Alexandra Brankova (Swedish Defence University)

11:25 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Stepping into the Future: Military Technology, Innovation Practices, and Contemporary Challenges

This panel focuses on the interplay between military technology and global security – and how scholars study it. Emerging technologies are unquestionably shaping the ways in which policy makers, military, and industry do security and defence. New developments in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, hypersonics, quantum computing, and space technology are projected to have transformative – even disruptive – effects on strategic stability, military innovation, defence economics, and the conduct of warfare. Most new military technology is dual use and has commercial origins, widening the spectrum of threats and actors with access to technology thanks to cheaper alternatives to military-grade systems. This trend affects the relations among commercial interests (private companies), scientific thought leaders (epistemic communities), those who weaponize technology (militaries), and those who develop technology policy (political leaders). Research on designing key principles for global technology governance and standards for military applications of emerging technologies is in high demand, while the dynamics between old and new technologies on the battlefields is still poorly understood. At the same time, how we study military technology requires more methodological rigor. Responsible forecasting is yet to moderate exaggerated expectations about military technology’s capabilities, inclinations to technological determinism, and strategic overkills. This panel invites submissions that theoretically and conceptually advance our understanding of how military technology changes the security environment. It encourages diversity in scientific disciplines (political science, sociology, economy, history, philosophy), theories, and methods, since the panel primarily aims to facilitate dialogue between scholars interested in how politics and technology interact.

Convener: Jennifer Erickson

41 Selling the Future of War: Discursive Power and Military Innovation

How do ideas about military technology become politically influential? This paper sets out to examines how competing visions of military technology emerge, gain dominance, and shape German defence planning. It focuses on public debates surrounding ‘classic’ (armour, artillery, etc.) and innovative military technologies (autonomous weapon systems, AI targeting, UAS/UGV, etc.), and analyses whether shifts in discursive prominence are reflected in formal defence planning and procurement decisions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s Zeitenwende.
The paper advances an ideational political economy account of military innovation. It argues that under crisis and uncertainty, narratives structure how security problems are defined and which technological solutions appear urgent and legitimate. Private actors, like neo-defence start-ups, promote solutionist narratives presenting innovation as strategically necessary and economically efficient. Through discursive coalitions and epistemic authority claims, certain ideas structure agenda-setting and prioritization in defence planning and procurement while others remain marginal.
Empirically, the paper combines large-scale text analysis through Discourse Network Analysis, document analysis, and elite interviews. The core dataset includes roughly three million German newspaper articles (2020-present), defence strategy documents, procurement decisions, capability programmes, and defence firm materials. I trace narrative evolution with Discourse Network Analysis, identify coalitions, and measure shifts in idea dominance (classic versus innovative military technologies), linking these temporally to defence decisions, to demonstrate how ideas become politically influential.
This paper aims to answer how competing ideas about military technology shape agenda-setting and procurement in German defence policy and makes three contributions. Empirically, it provides the first systematic, longitudinal mapping of military innovation framing and prioritisation in German defence debates since 2020. Theoretically, it demonstrates how ideational power and solutionist narratives shape security sector prioritization. Methodologically, it shows how discourse network analysis can connect large-scale public debate to defence planning, with implications for understanding how commercially driven narratives influence national security policy.

Speaker: Nicolas Krieger (Technical University of Munich)

42 Disclosure and Duplicity: How Technology Influences International Competition

How do states manage information when building military capabilities? Some weapons are developed openly while others are concealed within secret programs or disguised behind civilian cover. This article introduces arming strategy as a new dependent variable, arguing that two technology attributes shape the disclosure and deception choices critical to information management: fragility (ease of degrading military advantages upon exposure) and distinguishability (difficulty of separating military from civilian applications). Together, these variables generate four optimal strategies that maximize returns on military power while minimizing costs: reveal, conceal, obfuscate, or distort. Large-n qualitative analysis across the complete universe of modern military technologies provides strong support—most cases show states converging on predicted strategies. The results identify generalizable mechanisms linking technological characteristics to predictable information strategies across diverse historical contexts. The framework enables scholars and practitioners to assess how the features of emerging technologies will affect future international competition.

Speakers: Tristan Volpe (IFSH University of Hamburg / Naval Postgraduate School), Prof. Jane Vaynman (SAIS Johns Hopkins)

43 Winning the Battles of Innovation and Production: How Russia and Ukraine Mobilize STEM Expertise and Industry

The Russo-Ukrainian War stands out as the first war within decades that drove states to mobilize their industrial and innovative potential. Overwhelmingly, wars since 1945 have either been short or have been fought at lower levels of intensity. As such, they were won or lost based on the equipment already in stock or that could be procured through peacetime procedures. Since 2022, Russia and Ukraine have expanded their defence industries and exploited scientific and engineering expertise that lies outside of traditional defence industries. Our research comparatively charts how both sides have undertaken this process.
To preview our conclusions, Russia’s and Ukraine’s initial steps differed radically from one another. Russia adopted a centralized approach, increasing the workforce and shifts at state-owned defence firms. Russia’s government efficaciously organized the mass evasion of sanctions, purchases of machine tools and recruitment of foreign workers. Ukraine, meanwhile, devolved procurement authority to a wider array of actors. In addition to the MoD, the Ministry for Digital Transformation, Military Intelligence (HUR), Foreign Intelligence (SBU) and a series of patriotic NGOs. This highly competitive environment fuelled an expansion in start-ups and innovation.
These distinct defence-industrial ecosystems generated comparative advantages. The Ukrainian system broadly proved more innovative, while Russia’s facilitated the rapid scaling of production.

Speakers: Kristen Harkness (University of St. Andrews), Marc DeVore (University of St. Andrews)

44 Sending the Wrong Signals: When Armaments Worry Allies

While the role of armaments, and in particular forward-deployed military forces, as signals of reassurance is well-established in the scholarly literature, existing research has not explored when and why armaments may worry allies. In this paper, I consider disagreements between allies about the right armaments by the patron for the defense of a client as symptoms of defense misalignment, reflecting deeper disagreements about the preferred way of warfare among allies. The article proposes a novel theory of armaments as signals of defense misalignment to explain how certain types of armaments can prove contentious between allies. In essence, armaments can trigger conflicts between allies by transforming abstract defense strategies, drafted by political logic, into tangible, material capabilities. As armaments resolve the contradictions and pin down the ambiguities, deliberately included in the strategy for political reasons, they bring the underlying conflicts, stemming from allies’ divergent security interests, back to the fore. I offer a typology of characteristics that render armaments particularly prone to reveal instances of defense misalignment, and I test my theory through case studies on intra-NATO disputes about the role of nuclear forces for the alliance’s defense during the Cold War. My findings are particularly relevant to the context of European defense today. A better understanding of the role of armaments in revealing instances of defense misalignment is essential for safeguarding political cohesion between European NATO allies.

Speaker: Tim Thies (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg)

11:25 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

12:00 Lunch

Extended Nuclear Deterrence through European Eyes

Convener: Ludovica Castelli

45 What are tactical nuclear weapons for? The multiple logics of NATO’s theater nuclear posture

Speaker: Linde Desmaele (Leiden University)

46 'Europe is Not a Country': Nuclear Patronage and Eurodeterrence Concerns in the Frontline States

Speaker: Christopher David LaRoche (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Central European University)

47 Patterns of Foreign Nuclear Deployment: Understanding Host State Refusal in NATO

Speaker: Jacklyn Majnemer (LSE)

48 Conceptualizing Nuclear Umbrellas

Speaker: Alexander Sorg (Hertie School)

13:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Cyber and Digital Sovereignty

Convener: Moritz Weiss (LMU Munich)

49 AI-Driven Cloud Monitoring and Cyber Situational Awareness in European Digital Infrastructures

Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing, combined with IoT systems through digital interconnection, create virtual environments that merge with physical spaces. The new operational capabilities that these transformations bring to European digital ecosystems create security challenges, governance issues and societal concerns. Existing research on AI-based security solutions focuses on their technical performance, but neglects the effects that these systems have on cyber situational awareness and decision-making, as well as regulatory compliance.
This paper examines the improvement of cyber situational awareness through AI-powered cloud monitoring systems and visual analytics tools operating in distributed cloud-IoT environments. The study explores human-AI teamwork in automated systems by analyzing data collected from experimental monitoring platforms and intelligent traffic analysis scenarios to show how this collaboration enables early detection of anomalies and helps people understand cyber events, while organizations work together to respond to security incidents across their shared networks. The analysis explores the practical aspects of governance and operational aspects of European digital environments by assessing their technical performance. The assessment assesses data governance, model transparency and privacy protection, system interoperability, and accountability. The paper, through its interdisciplinary approach, which connects cybersecurity engineering with digital governance and security studies, shows that AI monitoring systems function as socio-technical systems that guide the way organizations assess strategic risks and develop their policies. The results show that critical digital ecosystems in Europe require comprehensive frameworks that combine cutting-edge analytics with governance systems designed to maintain transparent operations for trusted and resilient implementation of intelligent surveillance technology.
The research work establishes its value to ongoing digital transformation studies through the connection of technological progress to both practical aspects and organizational elements that drive research development.

Speaker: Prof. Daniela Mechkaroska (University of Information Science and Technology “St. Paul the Apostle”, Ohrid, N.Macedonia)

50 Quantum-Resilient SATIN and European Digital Sovereignty

This contribution presents and discusses quantum-resilient Space–Aerial–Terrestrial Networks (SATIN) as a crucial enabler of European future-proof digital sovereignty, strengthening secure communications, resilient critical infrastructure, and reinforcing Europe’s leadership across satellite, drone, and terrestrial networking domains.

Speaker: Dr Gürkan Gür (Zurich University of Applied Sciences ZHAW)

EISS2026PanelContribution_GurkanGur.pdf

51 From National Incident Response to Zero Trust: Bridging Cyber Defence Policy and Technical Implementation in Wartime Ukraine

The ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine has served as an unprecedented stress test for
national cybersecurity frameworks, exposing both the capabilities and limitations of
existing cyber defence architectures under sustained adversarial pressure. This
paper examines two interrelated dimensions of cybersecurity governance that have
gained acute relevance in the context of European security: national-level cyber
incident prioritization and the adoption of zero trust architecture (ZTA) as a paradigm
shift in organizational security.
First, the paper presents a novel multi-factor methodology for cyber incident
prioritization developed for deployment within the CERT-UA operational environment.
This methodology integrates the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) with
Ukraine’s national criticality levels through a hierarchical framework that incorporates
structured tie-breaking via multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). Simulation results
demonstrate its effectiveness in handling high-volume incident inflows while
maintaining decisive and transparent resource allocation — a critical capability for
states operating under persistent cyber threat.
Second, the paper analyses the zero trust concept as a forward-looking security
paradigm for European critical infrastructure. Drawing on a systematic review of
international ZTA models and practical deployment experiences across enterprises, it
identifies the principal barriers to implementation — including awareness gaps,
workforce shortages, and organizational complexity — and proposes actionable
recommendations for policymakers and security professionals.
By connecting operational-level incident response with strategic-level architectural
transformation, this paper contributes to an emerging interdisciplinary dialogue at the
intersection of cybersecurity engineering, security governance, and defence policy. It
offers empirically grounded insights relevant to European states seeking to
strengthen their cyber resilience amid an evolving threat landscape shaped by state-
sponsored cyber operations, digital infrastructure dependencies, and the imperative
for collective cyber defence within NATO and EU frameworks.

Speaker: Vladyslav Vilihura

52 Classical geopolitics in cyberspace: Explaining cyber state behaviour with power position

Cyberspace is a new domain of state security competition that differs from the conventional and nuclear realms, most notably because states are constantly engaged in cyberspace operations below the threshold of armed attacks. This inclines many scholars to use new approaches, both theoretically and empirically, to measure and explain cyber state behaviour. This paper argues that classical neorealist literature, which assumes that geographic features and military resources predict state behaviour, is applicable to the new realm. Building on this, it proposes that the power position of a state, co-constituted by its vulnerability and resources, can explain offensive or defensive behaviour in cyberspace. The paper maps 31 states engaged in cyber security competition and overall confirms classical geopolitics expectations, where vulnerable and resourceful states (“land powers”) behave offensively, while less vulnerable ones (“sea powers”) tend to behave defensively. The paper sets a counterpoint to the prevailing “cyber exceptionalism” and contributes to ongoing debates about the offense-advantage in cyberspace, as well as the equalizing effect of cyber conflict on power politics in conventional realms.

Speaker: Lorenz Sommer (Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science, LMU Munich)

13:45 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Regional Security in the Balkans

Convener: Filip Ejdus (University of Belgrade)

53 Western Balkan Criminal Groups and the Transformation of Regional Security

Criminal groups in the Western Balkans are influential non-state actors which informally regulate illegal markets, provide protection, and establish strategic partnerships with political and economic elites. They operate outside, alongside, and sometimes within state structures, and often through robust cross-border networks. They are quite flexible and adapt quickly to the evolving practices of law enforcement agencies, border regimes, and changing regional contexts. In this sense, criminal groups contribute to the emergence of a hybrid security environment in which formal and informal actors coexist and interact, and in doing so, they undermine state governance. One of the greatest challenges for such societies is the manifestation of the so-called “captured state,” which corrupts the justice system and renders institutions powerless to deal with organised crime.
Organised crime is often viewed primarily through the prism of law enforcement and the judiciary. This paper therefore seeks to move beyond this by analysing criminal groups in the Western Balkans from a different perspective – namely, how they function as actors of informal power and their impact on security governance, territorial control and cross-border stability. In this regard, these dynamics are examined in the context of state-oriented approaches to regional security and inter-state trust in fragile and post-transition contexts, such as South-Eastern Europe and, more specifically, the Western Balkans. In particular, the paper explores how weak institutional capacity, corruption and fragmented regional cooperation serve as enablers that these groups exploit to establish robust and flexible transnational networks. The findings of the analysis in this research suggest that the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans, in addition to stronger law enforcement and the rule of law, requires institutional reforms, governance-oriented approaches and a deeper understanding of the political and governance roles that criminal groups play within regional security.

Speaker: Dr Kire Babanoski (Faculty of Security - Skopje, University "St. Kliment Ohridski" Bitola, North Macedonia)

Western Balkan Criminal Groups and the Transformation of Regional Security.docx

54 Peace as Stalemate: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Forever Missions and the Strategic Logic of Frozen Peace

More than three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains subject to a continuous international military presence and extensive external governance, yet without achieving political stability or institutional consolidation. This paper examines Bosnia as a paradigmatic case of forever missions and frozen peace: interventions that successfully prevent renewed violence while entrenching political stalemate.
Building on theories of prolonged military intervention, conflict management, and institutional lock-in, the paper argues that the Dayton framework transformed peacekeeping from a temporary stabilisation mechanism into a permanent substitute for political settlement. While empirically centred on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the analysis situates the case within a broader universe of long-term interventions – including Kosovo, Cyprus, and Lebanon – where external military presence sustains stability without resolving underlying political conflict.
The paper shows how Dayton institutionalised ethnic vetoes, fragmented authority, and international oversight, producing a condition of managed instability in which peace persists but sovereignty and democratic accountability remain suspended. International military presence, while effective in preventing violence, has thus become structurally necessary precisely because political settlement remains incomplete.
Addressing a central but underexplored question in the literature – how long-standing interventions might move beyond stalemate without triggering renewed conflict – the paper identifies the strategic trade-offs that transform peacekeeping into conflict management. It concludes by reflecting on what political recalibration would be required to shift from frozen peace toward genuine settlement, and what the Bosnian case reveals about the limits of military intervention as a tool of political transformation.

Speaker: Dr SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ (Institute for Development and International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia)

55 Pitfalls of Transitional Justice and (In)Security in the Western Balkans: Case Study of Serbia

Drawing on the author's previous work, this paper offers insight into the implementation of transitional justice policies in the Western Balkans after the violent wars that accompanied the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, with a focus on the former Yugoslav state of Serbia. This qualitative sociological analysis explores the paradoxical effects of the transitional justice process on Serbian populations and governments since 2001. The Serbian transitional justice process has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on the security of the entire Western Balkans region. The insecurity and instability of Serbian regimes are therefore analysed from a critical sociological perspective (Foucauldian discourse analysis) within the transitional justice framework of post-war liberal democratic development. A selection of key scholarly works on transitional justice in the Western Balkans and Serbia, as well as documents produced by international organisations and institutions, is reviewed.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how liberal notions of human and minority rights, justice, freedom, equality, rule of law, and peace in post-war societal reconstruction through the transitional justice process can have diverse and unintended consequences that contribute to the destabilisation and insecurity of the Western Balkans, which still struggles to maintain a steady course towards EU and NATO membership.
Key words: transitional justice process, (in)security of the Western Balkans, Serbia.

Speaker: Dr SANDRA CVIKIĆ (Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Regional Center Vukovar)

s.cvikic.paper.proposal.docx

56 Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Edge of European Stability

Bosnia and Herzegovina occupies a critical position in the security architecture of the Western Balkans, serving as a nexus of domestic vulnerabilities, regional dynamics, and broader European security concerns. This paper employs the multi-level security framework (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998) to examine the intersection of internal political fragmentation, institutional capacity, and external influences, including the European Union, NATO, and neighboring states. By integrating traditional state-centric security analysis with transnational and human-security dimensions, the study highlights the ways in which BiH’s structural complexities shape its resilience to both conventional and non-conventional threats.
Methodologically, the study is based on qualitative semi-structured interviews with senior management within BiH’s intelligence, security, and military institutions. These interviews provide nuanced insights into threat perception, operational challenges, and the interplay between domestic capabilities and foreign influence. The paper further situates BiH’s security landscape within the wider Western Balkan region, exploring how regional interdependencies, EU policies, and strategic external actors influence national and sub-regional security outcomes.
The findings underscore the importance of coordinated security approaches and highlight the potential for EU engagement to foster strategic stability, while preserving national sovereignty. This analysis contributes to the recent discourse by offering a case study of a post-conflict, geopolitically sensitive environment, illustrating the complexities of aligning domestic security policies with regional and European strategic frameworks.

Speaker: Prof. Kenan Hodžić (Assistant Professor)

2025 Authors Info.docx

2026 EISS Hodzic & Ahic COST BiH.docx

2026 Panel info Hodzic & Ahic.docx

57 Pitfalls of Transitional Justice and (In)Security in the Western Balkans: Case Study of Serbia

Drawing on the author's previous work, this paper offers insight into the implementation of transitional justice policies in the Western Balkans after the violent wars that accompanied the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, with a focus on the former Yugoslav state of Serbia. This qualitative sociological analysis explores the paradoxical effects of the transitional justice process on Serbian populations and governments since 2001. The Serbian transitional justice process has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on the security of the entire Western Balkans region. The insecurity and instability of Serbian regimes are therefore analysed from a critical sociological perspective (Foucauldian discourse analysis) within the transitional justice framework of post-war liberal democratic development. A selection of key scholarly works on transitional justice in the Western Balkans and Serbia, as well as documents produced by international organisations and institutions, is reviewed.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how liberal notions of human and minority rights, justice, freedom, equality, rule of law, and peace in post-war societal reconstruction through the transitional justice process can have diverse and unintended consequences that contribute to the destabilisation and insecurity of the Western Balkans, which still struggles to maintain a steady course towards EU and NATO membership.
Key words: transitional justice process, (in)security of the Western Balkans, Serbia.

Speaker: SANDRA CVIKIĆ (Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Regional Center Vukovar)

s.cvikic.paper.proposal.docx

15:10 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Military Transformation: Innovation and Strategic Change in the Transatlantic Context

Conveners: Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University), Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University)

58 The EU as a 21st Century Security State, Formed by Geopolitics and Bellicist Threat

This paper challenges the conventional assumption that EU political development lacks a bellicist foundation. I argue that external threats have been a necessary condition driving EU integration throughout its history, and that the EU can be understood as a 21st century regulatory security state. Drawing on original archival research from the Jean Monnet archives, I demonstrate that European integration entrepreneurs were explicitly motivated by security threats from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, contradicting claims that the EU emerged purely from economic logics. I trace bellicist dynamics across a longer durée starting with WWI coordination institutions through the 1940 Franco-British Union proposal to contemporary defense integration following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea.
The paper makes five interrelated claims. First, European integration has been driven by bellicist logic during key periods, particularly the early to mid-20th century and post-2014. Second, external threat is necessary but not sufficient for EU defense institutionalization; it also requires prior informal institutional layering. Third, bellicist state formation theory has been conceptually stretched beyond its original logic. Returning to Hintze and Tilly, I clarify that their theories predict systemic competitive pressures drive state formation, not direct warfare experience. Fourth, 21st century bellicist state formation operates through different mechanisms than earlier centuries. Modern states generate military capacity through debt financing, multinational weapons programs, and regulatory coordination rather than taxation and standing armies. Fifth, the EU possesses the infrastructural, monetary, judicial, and regulatory powers characteristic of contemporary security states. The EU's regulatory authority over defense industrial markets represents a distinctive but comparable form of security statecraft to traditional nation states.

Speaker: Kaija Schilde (Boston University)

59 NATO Military Capabilities and the Russian Threat: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the 2014 Russian Invasion

Following the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, most research examining NATO's response has focused on member state pledges to increase defense spending to at least two percent of GDP. Far less attention has been paid to whether and how NATO members' \textit{military capabilities}--the outputs of defense investment--changed in response to threats from Russia. We address this gap by examining this case to understand how external security threats shape state military capabilities. Using a difference-in-differences research design and leveraging data on NATO military capabilities from 2008–2022, we evaluate how proximity to Russia influenced post-2014 capability adjustments among 29 European NATO allies. We find that NATO allies bordering Russia significantly increased capabilities relative to more distant allies, consistent with expectations that vulnerability drives internal balancing. While existing research shows that overall NATO defense spending increased after 2014, we show that this did not uniformly translate into more military equipment and personnel across the alliance. These findings reflect enduring challenges with burden sharing and the influence of domestic political economies over defense matters, but they also suggest that countries faced with direct military threats can achieve efficiencies in converting spending to capabilities.

Speaker: Jordan Becker (United States Military Academy, West Point, Brussels School of Governance, Ecole de Guerre (IHEDN, IRSEM))

60 From Platforms to Networks: The Political Hurdles of Transitioning to Data-Centric Warfare

Modern military strategy is undergoing a paradigm shift, moving away from a "platform-centric" model defined by the capabilities of individual assets such as tanks, fighter jets, and carriers toward a "network-centric" model prioritizing connectivity, data fusion, and multi-domain integration. While the operational necessity of this transition is widely accepted, this paper argues that the primary obstacles to achieving actual data-centric warfare are not technological, but profoundly political and institutional.
This study analyzes the "politics of transformation" by identifying three distinct sources of friction that hinder the shift from hardware to software-defined defense. First, it examines the political economy of defense procurement, arguing that existing industrial bases and legislative funding models are path-dependent, favoring high-visibility legacy platforms over less tangible network architectures. Second, it addresses inter-service bureaucratic politics, highlighting how data-centric warfare requires a level of interoperability that threatens the budget autonomy and cultural identity of individual military branches. Finally, it explores the sovereignty paradox, where the necessity of allied data-sharing conflicts with national political imperatives to maintain strict control over sovereign information infrastructure.
By viewing military transformation through the lens of organizational politics and civil-military relations, this paper demonstrates that "networking" a military is a governance challenge as much as a technical one. It concludes that without significant reform in how political actors value, fund, and oversee defense acquisitions, Western militaries risk possessing advanced sensors that cannot communicate with one another, rendering them structurally unprepared for high-intensity, data-driven conflict.

Speaker: Mr Dumitru-Catalin Vasile (National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

Dumitru-Catalin_Vasile_From Platforms to Networks_Abstract.docx

61 NATO as an Innovation Hub? How Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Are Reshaping Allied Innovation

The literature on military diffusion has traditionally treated alliances as transmission paths through which nationally developed military technologies are disseminated among allies. In this view, NATO is exclusively portrayed as a forum for standardization and doctrinal coordination rather than also a site of military innovation. This paper revisits this understanding by examining organizational and governance changes within NATO following the adoption of its post-2021 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) strategy. Drawing on insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), the paper explores how the technological characteristics of EDTs, namely their dual-use nature and reliance on distributed, largely privatized innovation ecosystems, are reshaping how military innovation is organized and strategically coordinated through NATO. The analysis traces this shift through interpretive qualitative analysis of program architectures and research outputs of NATO’s Innovation Initiatives, including the post-2021 NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Collaborative Programme of Work (CPoW) and the launch of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) Challenge Programmes. The study shows that EDT-driven interdependencies in scientific expertise and innovation ecosystems are altering transatlantic innovation dynamics, encouraging NATO to institutionalize new forms of engagement with civilian scientists and private-sector actors. These changes have also supported the extension of NATO’s innovation initiatives into structured cooperation with the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners. The paper contributes to a better understanding of how the contemporary changes in the character of innovation are driving institutional change within NATO, positioning the Alliance not merely as a diffusion mechanism for national capabilities, but as a hub through which transnational military innovation linkages are shaping patterns of military capability development.

Speaker: Vasiliki Plessia Aravani (Diplomatische Academie Wien, University of Vienna)

NATO as an Innovation Hub_Plessia Aravani.pdf

15:00 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Coffee break

Beyond the State

Private and extra-legal actors are at the center of politics today. A proliferation of these actors — including mercenaries, private security companies, cartels, gangs, local militias, and rebels, among others — has been identified as the central source of the state’s loss of monopoly over the use of violence and influence over its territories and communities. Throughout the world, these actors have been fulfilling political functions through the use and threat of violence and by cultivating complex and overlapping relationships with each other, local communities, and the state. The behaviors of these actors and interactions between them, local communities, and the state have significant political and social consequences that we are only beginning to understand. The panel aims to explore these complex links and interactions at the local, national and transnational levels. It aims to bring scholars seeking to understand the history, dynamics, and policy implications of this increasingly complicated landscape. It intends to address the following questions: How and why do extra-legal actors use violence, and what are the consequences of this violence? How and why do these same actors seek to provide goods and services to communities and create social and political orders? How have states responded to these actors, and why have they sometimes chosen to collaborate with and support them and others to combat them fiercely? How have citizens and local communities responded to these actors? What moral and legal challenges do these interactions imply? The panel welcomes diverse theoretical and methodological approaches to the connections between private and public spheres in international security.

Convener: Mark Rhinard (Stockholm University)

62 Beyond the State: Voluntary Civilian Pro-Defence Organisations and Security Governance in Georgia

This paper explores how the resurgence of interstate war in Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reconfigured relations between defence and society, with particular attention to the role of voluntary pro-defence organisations in security governance. Over the past decade, states historically alert to Russian imperialism have increasingly embraced comprehensive defence frameworks that extend beyond traditional military institutions and emphasise whole-of-society participation. Building on long-standing traditions of civil resistance and national defence, civilian pro-defence organisations have gained renewed prominence across the Baltics, Nordics, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Taking Georgia as a case, this paper focuses on the relational dynamics between the state defence institutions and voluntary civilian pro-defence organisations. More specifically, the paper highlights how state actors seek to transform bottom-up societal mobilisation into a more sustained source of societal resilience and national defence capacity, while non-state actors simultaneously negotiate autonomy, legitimacy, and influence within evolving security and political landscape. These dynamics generate both opportunities and tensions. Hence, moving beyond narrated notions of willingness to defend, the paper explores the practices and interactions through which defence roles are negotiated, contested, and/or redefined.
Building on civil-military relations theory, the paper posits that voluntary pro-defence organisations both complement and challenge traditional state authority, blurring the boundaries between civilian and military spheres and redefining the limits of state control over security governance. The paper will draw on textual analysis, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Georgian Defence Forces, and voluntary civilian pro-defence organisations, as well as participant observations conducted through field ethnography planned in February-March 2026.

Speaker: Rusudan Zabakhidze (Swedish Defence University)

63 From Privateers to Private Maritime Security: Irregular Maritime Actors and the Long History of Delegated Security at Sea

This paper examines the re-emergence of private maritime security companies (PMSCs) in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, situating their rise within both recent developments in maritime security and a broader historical context. Since the early 2000s, PMSCs have become a visible feature of global shipping security, particularly in response to piracy and other low-intensity maritime threats. Their growing role as non-state actors operating in the maritime domain raises important questions about the organization of coercive power at sea and the boundaries of state authority.

Drawing on my ongoing PhD research, the paper focuses on the structural conditions that enabled the expansion of PMSCs rather than treating their emergence as a purely novel or exceptional phenomenon. It highlights how the globalization of trade, the rapid growth of the merchant fleet, and the post–Cold War contraction and reprioritization of naval forces created persistent capacity gaps in maritime security provision. Within this context, PMSCs emerged as a practical solution to long-standing challenges of securing vast and dispersed sea lines of communication, particularly in regions where states lacked the resources or political willingness to provide continuous protection.

The paper then briefly situates contemporary PMSCs within a longer historical trajectory of delegated maritime violence, comparing them to earlier non-state and semi-state actors such as privateers and chartered trading companies. This historical perspective demonstrates that the involvement of non-state actors in maritime security has been a recurrent feature of naval warfare and maritime order rather than an anomaly of the contemporary era. By placing PMSCs within this longer continuum, the paper contributes to discussions on non-state actors and security governance by showing how states have repeatedly adapted the distribution of authority at sea in response to changing economic, strategic, and technological conditions.

Speaker: Pieter Zhao (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

64 Criminalising Solidarity: Border Securitisation, Non-State Actors, and Vernacular Humanitarianism in Europe

Border securitisation, externalisation, and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance in migration contexts have become increasingly prominent features of European migration governance. This paper explores the phenomenon of the criminalisation of solidarity through a comparative overview of these practices in France, Italy, Greece, and Spain, alongside the liminal case of Serbia as a non-EU transit country along the Balkan route. While in EU migration hotspots, the criminalisation of solidarity is predominantly institutionalised through legal and judicial frameworks, the Serbian case demonstrates how humanitarian assistance can be constrained through informal and extralegal governance practices, producing effects comparable to formal criminalisation. By examining the impact of these practices on non-state actors, primarily humanitarian NGOs, the paper highlights how policies of border securitisation and the criminalisation of humanitarian aid not only target irregular migration, but actively restructure the space for humanitarian action. It argues that such policies not only have severe consequences for migrants and humanitarian actors, but also reshape understandings of the rule of law, human rights, and human dignity. Drawing on the concept of vernacular humanitarianism, solidarity is conceptualised as an established, non-institutionalised practice that increasingly becomes an object of security governance. This perspective allows for an overview of how everyday practices of care and assistance are transformed into sites of political contestation, where moral obligation collides with legal restriction and security rationalities. Placed in the context of broader political and cultural transformations of migration governance, the paper explores whether these practices undermine solidarity-based forms of action and contribute to shifting collective values in contemporary Europe. Finally, it examines how the suppression of humanitarian work reconfigures cultural narratives of care, responsibility, and ethics within increasingly securitised migration regimes.
Key words: securitisation, border policy, migration, criminalisation, solidarity

Speaker: Mia Abdić

Abdić_Criminalising Solidarity_Abstract.pdf

65 The Strategic Logic of Violence During Negotiations

Negotiations are essential to ending armed conflict, yet we know surprisingly little about how violence evolves during the negotiation process itself. While existing research demonstrates that negotiations are essential for ending armed conflicts, most studies treat “negotiations” as a single event rather than a dynamic, multi-round process. This paper examines how armed groups behave across successive rounds of negotiations, asking when, why, and by whom violence is used or restrained during these periods. We argue that actors strategically calibrate violence to signal credibility, control, and commitment. Dominant or established groups often exercise restraint to demonstrate command and seriousness, while smaller, excluded, or newer factions use violence—especially against civilians—to assert capability, expand control, or spoil the process. Empirically, we combine new data on daily levels of violence with information on the timing and structure of peace talks across dyads and negotiation rounds. The unit of analysis is the conflict-day, allowing us to trace shifts in violence both within and across rounds of talks. This paper offers a first step toward understanding how violence operates during the negotiation process, setting the stage for broader questions about why some peace efforts collapse early, why others endure through multiple rounds, and how the sequencing and structure of talks influence the trajectory of violence on the ground.

Speaker: Johannes Lucht (ETH Zurich)

16:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

War & Strategy: Strategic Deterrence under Duress

War has returned to Europe. However, European strategic thinking and understanding of war remain underdeveloped, stemming from a long-standing reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the widespread belief that war was a relic of the past. As European actors grapple with this new reality, now is an opportune moment to critically examine existing knowledge on war and strategy, assess its relevance to contemporary contexts, and encourage innovative perspectives. This panel seeks to serve as a platform for advancing a European debate on the use of force for political purposes. It invites papers addressing war and strategy in a broad and inclusive sense, drawing from a variety of disciplines—such as history, political science, and sociology—and engaging with diverse approaches—from fundamental ontological and theoretical questions (such as, what is war and how do we know?) to empirical analyses examining the specifics of military capabilities and their implications for strategy. Submissions may focus on both historical and contemporary topics and explore various factors shaping strategy, including technological, cultural, social, and environmental influences, moral and ethical considerations, and the role of ideas, discourses, and imaginaries of (future) war in shaping today’s thinking. The panel also encourages innovative engagements with key concepts in strategic studies—such as deterrence, escalation, and violence—and contributions that critically but constructively evaluate the current state of the field or the dynamics and outcomes of knowledge production on war.

Convener: Jan Angstrom (Swedish Defence University)

66 Explaining Heterogeneity in Public Support for Collective Defense in NATO: Evidence from a Cross - National Survey of Allied Countries

The deteriorating European security environment underscores the continuing relevance of NATO’s collective defence commitments. Since NATO is a military alliance comprising 32 electoral democracies, the commitment to defend any member relies on the domestic politics of its members. For these commitments to be credible, the alliance requires domestic political consensus and public support for defending allies that become targets of external aggression. However, NATO’s annual surveys reveal striking cross-national heterogeneity among allied states in public willingness to honour their collective defence commitments under Article 5. Despite the increased interest in examining the microfoundations of alliance politics, we still lack systematic explanations for why the publics in some member states are more hesitant to defend allies than in others. To address this important gap, we will analyse data from a unique multi-year survey conducted on nationally representative samples across all NATO countries. Using multilevel statistical modelling, our study will provide the first evidence on country- and individual-level factors that explain the large cross-national variation in public views on collective defence. Our findings will contribute to scholarly debates on the role of public opinion in military alliances and the pressing policy discussions about NATO’s cohesion and credibility.

Speaker: Isabelle Haynes (Charles University)

67 The Confidence Trap: Leader-Advisor Deliberations and the Making of (In)Credible Threats

Conventional wisdom holds that states with superior capabilities, clear interests, and strong reputations issue more credible threats, while weaker states struggle to convince. Yet strong states sometimes fail to convince while weaker states occasionally succeed. Why? I argue that credibility is first formed within internal deliberations, shaped by how leaders interact with their advisors before a threat is ever issued. Drawing on findings from the Judge-Advisor System framework of advice utilisation from social psychology, I develop the Confidence Trap Theory to explain how confidence – the extent to which individuals are certain their judgments are correct – shapes the making of (in)credible threats. Leaders assimilate advice selectively: those who are certain dismiss dissent, reinforce preexisting assessments and issue threats that collapse when tested, while those who are uncertain seek multiple perspectives, second-guess their assessments and produce hesitant, ambiguous signals that adversaries ignore. Advisors differ in how forcefully they communicate advice: those who are certain advocate strongly for their position, while those who are uncertain hedge and dilute the clarity of threats. Using case studies of President Truman’s and Chairman Mao’s decision-making at the start of the Korean War, I test CTT against an allies-influence competing explanation, which conceptualises allied consultation as an external advisory input shaping leaders’ threat construction. On the U.S. side, the analysis examines advisory exchanges with the U.K. and India. On the Chinese side, it examines interactions with the Soviet Union and North Korea. Drawing on English- and Mandarin-language primary sources, I find strong support for CTT in the U.S. case and moderate support in the Chinese case. Truman’s overconfidence produced threats that failed to deter, while Mao’s handling of allied inputs enabled more calibrated threat construction that drew Washington into overcommitment. The findings suggest that understanding confidence dynamics can enhance credibility construction across diverse strategic contexts.

Speaker: Wendy He (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU))

68 Cooperation under Stress: Organisational Compatibility and NATO–EU Cooperation in a Fractured Transatlantic Order

Recent debates on transatlantic security cooperation widely assume that renewed political tensions -- most notably driven by the Trump II administration -- have undermined cooperation between NATO and the European Union. Such claims typically rest on assessments of strategic alignment at the political level. This paper argues that these assessments risk running ahead of what is currently known about cooperation as it is organised and practiced. Whether NATO–EU cooperation actually deteriorates under geopolitical strain depends not only on shifts in grand strategy, but also on the compatibility of the organisational and cultural interfaces through which cooperation is enacted. Drawing on inter-organisational relations, organisational theory, and international practice theory, the paper develops a framework that distinguishes three analytically separable but empirically interacting dimensions of cooperation: strategic alignment, structural compatibility, and cultural coherence. Rather than presuming either decline or resilience, the framework treats political disruption as a stress test that reshapes relationships among these dimensions. It generates observable expectations about how political contestation, procedural frictions, and breakdowns in trust and shared routines shape cooperation outcomes under geopolitical strain. The paper is primarily conceptual and framework-building. It uses the framework to take stock of NATO–EU cooperation across three areas central to societal security -- critical infrastructure protection, hybrid threats, and emergency preparedness -- laying the conceptual groundwork for a broader empirical research agenda on inter-organisational cooperation under conditions of geopolitical uncertainty.

Speakers: Mark Rhinard (Stockholm University), Dr Niklas Bremberg

69 Soft Power as Deterrence: Non-Kinetic Strategy and Alignment Politics in U.S.–China Competition

Deterrence is conventionally understood as the prevention of unwanted actions through the threat of military retaliation or economic punishment. This paper argues that such a conception is increasingly insufficient for explaining how influence and restraint operate in contemporary strategic competition. Drawing on debates in deterrence theory, grand strategy, and soft power, the paper advances the concept of soft power as deterrence: a non-kinetic strategic mechanism through which states shape the alignment choices of partners and raise the political, reputational, and institutional costs of defection without recourse to coercion.

The argument is developed through an analysis of U.S. and Chinese competition for influence in Thailand, a strategically significant middle power that has long hedged between major actors. Rather than focusing on overt pressure or alliance commitments, the paper examines how credibility, institutional embeddedness, elite socialisation, educational exchange, and information environments function as deterrent mechanisms by structuring the strategic context in which alignment decisions are made. These practices do not compel compliance, but they condition behaviour by making certain strategic choices more costly or less credible over time.

Conceptually, the paper reframes soft power not as persuasion or attraction alone, but as a strategic instrument that operates by constraining the range of acceptable political action. Empirically, it shows how non-kinetic influence can stabilise cooperation, deter defection, and shape long-term strategic orientation even in the absence of formal alliances or explicit threats. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this framework for European security debates, particularly in relation to deterrence beyond the military domain, strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, and the growing importance of legitimacy, trust, and institutional presence in contemporary grand strategy.

Speaker: Mr Joseph Black (Chiang Mai University, King's College London)

16:40 15 minutes of discussant comments and Q&A Session

Concluding Remarks

Award of the European Security Studies Best Paper Prize
In partnership with the Journal of Strategic Studies

Conveners: Julia Carver (Leiden University), Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University), Magnus Petersson (Stockholm University), Moritz Weiss (LMU Munich)

Reception & Poster Presentations

Conveners: Archishman Ray Goswami (DPhil International Relations, University of Oxford), Fiona Galvis, Gulzhan Asylbek kyzy (UNU-MERIT), Lucian Bumeder (IFSH)

70 “A Nuclear War Cannot be Won and Must Never be Fought”: Analyzing the U.S. Response to Russian Nuclear Threats in Ukraine

Speaker: Fiona Galvis

71 State fragility, power sharing institutions and group inequalities

Speaker: Gulzhan Asylbek kyzy (UNU-MERIT)

72 A Shadow in the Clouds: Where Is Germany’s Missile Posture Heading?

Speaker: Lucian Bumeder (IFSH)

73 Speak through the Nocturne: Navigating Strategic Interest in Intelligence Diplomacy

Speaker: Archishman Ray Goswami (DPhil International Relations, University of Oxford)