Description
Worried about the viability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (USED), European leaders have begun considering arrangements of their own — most notably the 2025 Franco-British Northwood declaration. This paper assesses the institutional architecture required for a viable Eurodeterrent. It does so by asking: what are the institutional tradeoffs between credible assurance and strategic viability across different Eurodeterrence scenarios? Extended deterrence inherently involves tradeoffs between patron costs (investments in assurance mechanisms) and collaboration risks (coordination and defection problems among allies). My tentative argument is these cost/collaboration tradeoffs are exacerbated by two European realities: France and the UK are weaker potential deterrence patrons than the United States — making assurance costly — and European protégés have divergent strategic interests — complicating collaboration. While tradeoff specifics vary by Eurodeterrence scenario, their net effect may discount the proximity advantages of European nuclear patronage, undermining its viability. I answer my question in two parts. First, I use extended deterrence and organizational theory to conceptually identify potential tradeoffs across three Eurodeterrence scenarios. Given the perceptual nature of assurance, however, the results require empirical investigation. Second, I use the conceptual framework to guide semi-structured interviews with European policymakers in the frontline states — where the demand-side of deterrence is most acute. The interviews will investigate what Eurodeterrence scenarios protégé policymakers think are viable as a USED supplement or even substitution. Under what conditions might (e.g.) Warsaw trust Paris and London — and more than Washington? A second aim is to complement current patron-focused discussions by incorporating viewpoints from potential protégés with high stakes in Eurodeterrence collaboration.