Description
European security landscape has changed dramatically since 2022, but European security practices remain anchored in the Cold War conceptions of deterrence. This raises a critical question: is deterrence, as currently understood and applied in Europe, still fit for purpose in today’s vastly transformed security environment, where many of the security threats cannot be “scared away” but rather need to be discouraged and prevented in other means.
Understanding the different ways in which deterrence is being discussed within individual countries, NATO, and increasingly in the European Union, is crucial to ensuring a coherent internal debate and external communication. If European countries have remarkably divergent understandings of deterrence, it is difficult, if not impossible to build a credible security and defence structures that reflect and respond to the realities of the 21st century. Moreover, in order to send a credible and coherent message to adversaries, such as Russia, Europe needs a better self-understanding of how what European deterrence actually means.
In this paper, I examine how deterrence is defined in different European linguistic and cultural contexts, and what conceptual differences emerge from these linguistic variations and how these shape national and European-wide deterrence debates. The main interest of the paper is finding out whether deterrence is still discussed as a concept centred around nuclear weapons and retaliation or whether it incorporates conventional, hybrid and even resilience dimensions as well. Based on this, I will evaluate whether current deterrence frameworks remain fit for purpose in addressing contemporary security threats, and explore pathways toward a more comprehensive and better aligned deterrence debate that responds to European security challenges.