Description
A growing number of observers and political actors believe Europe must substantially reinforce its defence capabilities. In France, nuclear deterrence is regularly advanced to highlight Paris’s strategic importance on the global stage and, in a context of heightened aggressiveness from Moscow, in addition to the potential reintroduction of military service, there has emerged a marked inclination to expand the nuclear arsenal, so as not to fall behind in the arms race.
In this article, I argue that there is nothing automatic or necessary in the need to increase the size of the nuclear arsenal or participate in the arms race. In this article, he identifies and rectifies three false, but commonly accepted notions which make such necessity of rearmament look obvious: (1) that these weapons provide protection, when ballistic missiles have made such protection impossible over six decades ago; (2) that the size of existing nuclear arsenals is necessary for deterrence, which is historically incorrect and ignores the emergent deterrent potential of conventional weaponry; and (3) that the possession of nuclear weapons is beneficial in all possible futures: on the contrary, it is irrelevant in some and harmful in others. Thus, the type and level of nuclear armament that is deemed desirable stems from subjective bets on the future, which need to be made explicit in the strategic debate.
The multiple threats they face into account instead of focusing on one only and not to address each in isolation. I argue that this is particularly important given the carbon footprint of the arms race and its effects on the perceived desirability of nuclear weapons, which is largely neglected in existing scholarship. I therefore propose a redefinition of ‘strict sufficiency’ as a criterion for determining the appropriate dimensions of national defence infrastructures, beyond the singular focus on nuclear forces.