Speakers
Description
In early 2024, Poland and the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced plans to put up fortifications along their eastern frontier. Yet one lesson that analysts might draw from contemporary experience is that defensive systems of the sort planned for parts of NATO’s so-called Eastern Flank have little to no utility except for sapping precious resources that could be spent elsewhere. We argue that this skepticism towards fortifications is misguided even though defence establishments must be attuned to the risk of catastrophic failure. A conventional defensive system must have depth and enable the ability to go about counteroffensives. A major reason for the historical failures associated with fortifications is because defenders either did not match the imagination of their adversaries or neglected the value of depth and counterstrike options. For those considering how to fortify the Eastern Flank, they must pair static defences with operational as well as organizational dynamism. We offer a framework for how to think about effective defence systems and use various case studies, two of which are drawn from the First World War, to substantiate our argument. We conclude by teasing the implications of our analysis for how Poland and the three Baltic countries can create effective defence systems.
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | No, I am submitting a Closed Panel abstract |
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| Would you like to be considered for travel funding through the NetSec COST Action? | No |
| Are you a member of the NetSec Management Committee? | No |
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | International Relations/Political Science |
| Which of the following best describes your stage of the career? | Associate Professor |
| In which country is your home institution? | Canada |
| What is your gender? | Prefer not to say |