Speaker
Description
Conventional wisdom holds that states with superior capabilities, clear interests, and strong reputations issue more credible threats, while weaker states struggle to convince. Yet strong states sometimes fail to convince while weaker states occasionally succeed. Why? I argue that credibility is first formed within internal deliberations, shaped by how leaders interact with their advisors before a threat is ever issued. Drawing on findings from the Judge-Advisor System framework of advice utilisation from social psychology, I develop the Confidence Trap Theory to explain how confidence – the extent to which individuals are certain their judgments are correct – shapes the making of (in)credible threats. Leaders assimilate advice selectively: those who are certain dismiss dissent, reinforce preexisting assessments and issue threats that collapse when tested, while those who are uncertain seek multiple perspectives, second-guess their assessments and produce hesitant, ambiguous signals that adversaries ignore. Advisors differ in how forcefully they communicate advice: those who are certain advocate strongly for their position, while those who are uncertain hedge and dilute the clarity of threats. Using case studies of President Truman’s and Chairman Mao’s decision-making at the start of the Korean War, I test CTT against an allies-influence competing explanation, which conceptualises allied consultation as an external advisory input shaping leaders’ threat construction. On the U.S. side, the analysis examines advisory exchanges with the U.K. and India. On the Chinese side, it examines interactions with the Soviet Union and North Korea. Drawing on English- and Mandarin-language primary sources, I find strong support for CTT in the U.S. case and moderate support in the Chinese case. Truman’s overconfidence produced threats that failed to deter, while Mao’s handling of allied inputs enabled more calibrated threat construction that drew Washington into overcommitment. The findings suggest that understanding confidence dynamics can enhance credibility construction across diverse strategic contexts.
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | No, I am submitting a Closed Panel abstract |
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| Would you like to be considered for travel funding through the NetSec COST Action? | Yes |
| Are you a member of the NetSec Management Committee? | No |
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | International Relations |
| Which of the following best describes your stage of the career? | Post-Doc (or within 3-year of PhD obtention) |
| In which country is your home institution? | Singapore |
| What is your gender? | Female |