Speaker
Description
This paper develops a typology of weak-actor deterrence communication, ranging from the extreme points of not properly applying deterrence as a strategy because clear communication of capabilities and resolve is lacking, to crystal-clear communication of red lines and the actions to be taken if these are crossed. In-between are approaches that leaves something to chance. The typology is based on deterrence theory and existing empirical studies of weak-actor deterrence communication. Conditions under which strategic clarity trumps strategic ambiguity are identified and discussed, as well as dilemmas pertaining to weak-actors depending on both direct and extended deterrence. The paper contributes to the literature on small state strategy and "how the weak deter the strong".
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | No, I am submitting a Closed Panel abstract |
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| Would you like to be considered for travel funding through the NetSec COST Action? | No |
| Are you a member of the NetSec Management Committee? | No |
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | Political Science |
| Which of the following best describes your stage of the career? | Associate Professor |
| In which country is your home institution? | Norway |
| What is your gender? | Female |