Speaker
Description
How effective is NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic region? Russia has been increasingly probing NATO reactions across the entirety of the Eastern Flank, normalising such incursions as part of its wider strategy of confrontation with NATO. Engaging with the foundations of deterrence theory, specifically the operative concepts of credibility and signalling of intent, the chapter argues that neither NATO’s actual deterrence by punishment nor its aspired deterrence by denial postures are sufficient to deter Russian hostile intentions. One of the key reasons for this is a false fear of the so-called escalation trap, as escalation in fact deters a revisionist actor such as Russia that does not harbor genuine insecurity. Another one is the inherent weakness of conventional deterrence, given its insufficient "power to hurt", to quote Thomas Schelling. The paper will explore how embracing escalation – those actions and strategies in both the Eastern Flank and Ukraine that would credibly signal resolve through readiness to accept high costs, by building substantial capabilities in the region and through transparent troop deployments - can affect the quality of NATO's deterrence posture.
| If you are submitting an Open Panel proposal, have you included all four abstracts in attachment? | Yes, I have included all required information (see below). |
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| Would you like to be considered for travel funding through the NetSec COST Action? | No |
| Are you a member of the NetSec Management Committee? | No |
| What discipline or branch of humanities or social sciences do you identify yourself with? | Political Science |
| Which of the following best describes your stage of the career? | Assistant Professor |
| In which country is your home institution? | Estonia |
| What is your gender? | Male |