Conveners
Conceptualizing Military Strategy: From Planning to War
- Chiara Libiseller (Leiden University)
Description
War has returned to Europe. However, European strategic thinking and understanding of war remain underdeveloped, stemming from a long-standing reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the widespread belief that war was a relic of the past. As European actors grapple with this new reality, now is an opportune moment to critically examine existing knowledge on war and strategy, assess its relevance to contemporary contexts, and encourage innovative perspectives. This panel seeks to serve as a platform for advancing a European debate on the use of force for political purposes. It invites papers addressing war and strategy in a broad and inclusive sense, drawing from a variety of disciplines—such as history, political science, and sociology—and engaging with diverse approaches—from fundamental ontological and theoretical questions (such as, what is war and how do we know?) to empirical analyses examining the specifics of military capabilities and their implications for strategy. Submissions may focus on both historical and contemporary topics and explore various factors shaping strategy, including technological, cultural, social, and environmental influences, moral and ethical considerations, and the role of ideas, discourses, and imaginaries of (future) war in shaping today’s thinking. The panel also encourages innovative engagements with key concepts in strategic studies—such as deterrence, escalation, and violence—and contributions that critically but constructively evaluate the current state of the field or the dynamics and outcomes of knowledge production on war.
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439. Fortifying the Eastern Flank: Leveraging Historical Lessons to Create Effective Defence SystemsAlexander Lanoszka, Dr Michael Hunzeker (George Mason University)11/06/2026, 16:00War and Strategy 1Paper Abstract (Closed Panels)
In early 2024, Poland and the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced plans to put up fortifications along their eastern frontier. Yet one lesson that analysts might draw from contemporary experience is that defensive systems of the sort planned for parts of NATO’s so-called Eastern Flank have little to no utility except for sapping precious resources that could be...
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Mariya Grinberg (MIT)11/06/2026, 16:10War and Strategy 1Paper Abstract (Closed Panels)
Why do states engage in wars for which they are un(der)prepared? Specifically, why do states enter wars when they have good reason to expect that they will not be able to achieve their strategic objectives with their chosen war plans? To understand why states would go to war with flawed plans, we need to know two things: (1) what options to modify the flawed initial war plan were available,...
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Dr Samuel Zilincik (Royal Danish Defence College)11/06/2026, 16:20War and Strategy 1Paper Abstract (Closed Panels)
NATO’s new operational concept Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) assumes combining various military and non-military tools is essential and beneficial for winning future wars. In this article, we offer a historical perspective to enunciate the MDO’s underlying philosophy. Specifically, we argue that combining tools is not inherently necessary nor beneficial, and that prioritisation of one tool can...
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Sara Russo (Centre for High Defence Studies (CASD))11/06/2026, 16:30War and Strategy 1Paper Abstract (Closed Panels)
Strategic competition is increasingly unfolding below the threshold of armed conflict, where influence over perception, legitimacy, and coordination might determine the outcomes without the use of force. While widely acknowledged, influence is still treated as an auxiliary component of military and political strategy, framed through information operations or psychological warfare. ...
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